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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The computer system that controls a crew-carrying space vehicle must be extremely
robust. Since a single system can be crippled by a single failure, a common design is
to use multiple redundant systems, all running the same program and voting on the
results. The challenge is to keep the replicas synchronized, and to arbitrate when they
disagree.
This thesis implements and evaluates schemes for authenticated communica-
tion between the replicas of a fault-tolerant computer system. Message authentication
adds digital signatures to messages to prevent the replicas from lying about the messages
they receive from each other, leading to a simpler and more reliable system. Like a
message authentication scheme for any other application, the one developed in this
thesis needs to be secure against forgery. Unlike most other message authentication
schemes, however, the one in this thesis also needs to fit within the unique constraints
imposed by a real-time embedded system, constraints that limit the amount of running
time and computational power available.
A variety of signature schemes are implemented and evaluated in this thesis.
One of the results is that traditional signature schemes like RSA are too slow for most
real-time embedded systems. Previous attempts to solve this problem have therefore
used cryptographically insecure signatures instead, based on techniques such as simple
11
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checksums and cyclic redundancy checks. However, this thesis will argue that crypto-
graphically insecure signatures are not satisfactory for any system that aims to achieve
the highest levels of fault tolerance. Recently, fast and secure signature schemes like the
ones based on multivariate quadratic equations have become available, enabling this
thesis to propose using cryptographically secure signatures for message authentication
in real-time fault-tolerant computer systems. These new signature schemes appear very
promising, although they are still slightly too slow for systems that need to send data
at a very high rate. The work of this thesis can be applied to lower-rate fault-tolerant
systems being built today, and to high-rate systems of the future when embedded pro-
cessors have become faster.
1.1 Fault-tolerant computer systems
Some computer systems must not fail, especially if people’s lives and safety depend on
the correct operation of the system. For certain systems, a single unreplicated unit
achieves the required level of reliability. However, an unreplicated system, even if
carefully designed and extensively tested, is still vulnerable to random hardware faults.
Therefore, an extremely robust system will likely need to be a replicated one.
Redundancy increases the chance of a system surviving faults. However, it also
increases the complexity. Howwill the replicas communicate and coordinate with each
other? More importantly, how will the system respond when the replicas, which are
supposed to be running the same program and producing the same results, disagree
with each other?
To analyze the behavior of the system as a whole when a replica fails, one
needs to consider how the replica fails. In the best case, the faulty replica might realize
12
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that it has entered an inconsistent state, and announce the error to the other replicas.
The other replicas would then know to exclude the results from that faulty replica. A
harder case to handle is when the faulty replica ceases to communicate altogether. The
remaining replicas would need to infer that the faulty replica has failed, most likely
using a timeout.
The hardest case to handle is when the faulty replica continues to communi-
cate, reporting incorrect results. The faulty replica may even report one result to some
of the non-faulty replicas, and a different result to the others. Since the non-faulty
replicas must maintain identical internal state, they must vote among themselves to
reach an agreement about how to handle the result from the faulty replica. This voting
process will take additional rounds of message exchange, and since the identity of the
faulty replica is not known a priori, the faulty replica will participate in the voting
process too, giving it additional opportunities to confuse the non-faulty replicas.
In this worst-case scenario, one might as well treat the faulty replica as if it were
malicious, and assume that it is deliberately choosing messages that will most confuse
the other replicas. (In some systems, especially ones in which each replica is controlled
by a different party, the faulty replica may actually be malicious.) This sort of behavior
from the faulty replica, called a Byzantine fault, must be tolerated in a robust system.
Of course, building a reliable system requires more than just handling misbe-
having replicas. If the replicas are not electrically isolated, for example, then a power
glitch in one may cause a power glitch in the others. And if all of the replicas are
running the same code, they will all be equally defenseless if the fault is caused by a
mistake in that code.
13
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1.2 Real-time embedded systems
A real-time system is one that must react in a strictly bounded amount of time. On
a desktop computer, one real-time task might be to reload the sound buffer before it
empties. In a space vehicle, the real-time task might be to fire a rocket. If the desktop
computer fails to react on time, then the music it is playing will skip. If the computer
controlling the space vehicle fails to react on time, then it will lose control of the
spacecraft.
Being a real-time system imposes several constraints on the design of the sys-
tem. One constraint is scheduling: since a computer system runs several tasks simul-
taneously in practice, a real-time design must make sure that every task can run when
it needs to. A real-time system also constrains the algorithms available to choose from.
An algorithm that runs quickly most of the time cannot be used if it runs slowly in the
worst cases.
Most real-time control systems are also embedded systems, which further limits
the resources available. A typical embedded processor might run an order of magnitude
slower than a contemporary desktop processor. In addition, processors for space flight
need to be radiation hardened, which again puts them a generation behind unhard-
ened processors. Because of the speed difference, many algorithms that run acceptably
quickly on desktop processors run too slowly on embedded processors.
1.3 The X-38 Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor
The Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) [RLB02] is an architecture for a fault-
tolerant computer system on top of which applications can run, developed at the
14
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Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. The X-38 FTPP is one incarnation of this architec-
ture, developed for NASA’s X-38 Crew Return Vehicle. This thesis attempts to develop
a message authentication scheme for a new version of the X-38 FTPP.
Generically speaking, the FTPP consists of a number of fault-containment
regions (also called channels), each of which contains a number of processors. The
fault-containment regions are isolated from each other, and they are designed to fail
independently. Each fault-containment region also has a network element, which is
connected to each of the other network elements, and which provides communication
between the fault-containment regions.
The processors in the FTPP can assume a variety of configurations. A pro-
cessor may run alone, or it may run the same program as one or more of its replicas,
each of which resides in a different fault-containment region. A program replicated on
multiple processors needs to be only minimally aware that it is running on multiple
processors; the network element ensures that each processor receives the same inputs
and arbitrates when their outputs differ. The network element performs the multiple
rounds of message exchange needed for the voting process.
In addition to fault-tolerant communication, the FTPP architecture also offers
facilities for fault-tolerant time synchronization, recovery and reconfiguration when a
replica fails, task scheduling, and other services as well.
1.4 Evolution to a software-based system
The X-38 FTPP is built out of mostly commodity parts, with the notable exception of
the network element, which is custom hardware. Draper Laboratory is engaged in a
project to build a new version of the FTPP that uses all commercial off-the-shelf parts,
15
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a project that this thesis is part of. The functions of the network element, which are
currently performed by dedicated hardware, will be implemented in software instead.
Moving to software has several advantages. It reduces the number of hardware
parts that can fail, and it also makes modifications and testing easier. Embedded proces-
sors have only recently become powerful enough to perform the network element’s job
in software. In addition, other tools for building robust software-based fault-tolerant
systems have also recently become available, such as partitioned real-time operating
systems, which allow strong separation between software components in a system. A
partitioned operating system strictly limits each component to its own share of mem-
ory, processor time, and other resources. (In contrast, a desktop operating system typ-
ically makes no such guarantee. For example, most desktop operating systems do not
guarantee that a given process will always run within a certain period after an interrupt,
regardless of whatever else the system is doing. Most desktop operating systems also do
not prevent one process from consuming so much memory that other processes cannot
allocate any.)
1.5 Authenticated messages
The move to a software-based system opens the opportunity for making some other
changes to the FTPP as well. Among the most significant of these changes is the
addition of authenticated messages to the message-voting process.
Message authentication allows the recipient of a message to verify that the mes-
sage genuinely originated from the claimed source, and that the message has not been
modified. Message authentication is achieved by augmenting the message with a digital
16
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signature, which the recipient verifies. The most relevant benefit of message authen-
tication to the voting process of a fault-tolerant system is that message authentication
prevents one replica from lying to another replica about what message a third replica
sent. Removing this particular vulnerability allows the system to be simplified while
retaining the same level of fault tolerance. Message authentication also helps detect
when messages have been corrupted in transit, but this is a more minor benefit, since
any reasonably robust system must already resist message corruption.
This thesis examines the many digital signature schemes available, and evalu-
ates their suitability for use in a real-time fault-tolerant system. Again, one of the more
important constraints this project faces is that the scheme must operate quickly, on
processors that have relatively limited computational power. To meet this constraint,
this thesis explores some of the less common signatures schemes in addition to the well-
known ones like RSA. It examines how to optimize the implementation of each of
these schemes. Finally, this thesis also considers the message-voting process itself, to
determine precisely which phases of it need message authentication.
1.6 Previous work
Fault-tolerant computer systems have been built for almost as long as computer sys-
tems have been, so it is impossible to give a complete account of all the research that
has enabled and shaped this thesis. Instead, this section will give a brief summary of
the influential systems that have been developed for applications that need extreme
reliability, such as flight control.
17
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1.6.1 Previous systems
The early attempts at building redundant fault-tolerant systems in the 1960s were im-
plemented with simple replication of hardware. For example, a processor would have
several memory units, and it would write the same data to all of them. Special circuitry
would detect disagreements among the memory units [HLS87].
The Fault-Tolerant Multi-Processor (FTMP), which was developed beginning
in 1975, used hardware for fault detection and masking. Processors were arranged in
groups of three, as were memory units, and dedicated hardware performed the voting
among them [HLS87]. The system was called a “multi-processor” because it ran several
different programs simultaneously on different sets of processors. It was only later
when computers had become faster that designs for redundant processors running only
a single task at a time were considered.
The contemporaneous rival to the FTMP was Software Implemented Fault
Tolerance (SIFT), which, as its name suggests, was a computer that used software to
implement voting and error detection. SIFT was built using off-the-shelf minicomput-
ers and microcomputers. The computers in SIFT were only loosely synchronized with
each other, and they would vote among themselves only at the end of an iteration of
a computation. This design made the analysis of the system simpler, since the analysis
only had to consider whether one of the computers had failed or not, and not whether
the individual components in each computer were failing. SIFT was also notable in
that it advocated formal mathematical proofs of correctness for the system [WLG78].
Unfortunately, performing the error detection and fault recovery in software was ex-
tremely slow. One evaluation determined that SIFT spent 80% of its computing power
on performing this overhead [PB86].
18
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The Fault Tolerant Processor (FTP) in the 1980s was the successor to the
FTMP. Unlike the FTMP, which was a multi-processor, the processors in the FTP
acted as a single virtual processor. The FTP used hardware to ensure that all of the
processors received the same input, and to vote on their outputs. Because of its simpler
design, the FTP was much more efficient than the earlier systems, and it was easier to
program as well [HLS87].
The Multicomputer Architecture for Fault-Tolerance (MAFT) was a system
designed in the late 1980s for high performance. Each node in MAFT consisted of
two parts, the operations controller and the application processor. The operations
controllers, which were connected to each other, handled all of the communication and
system management functions, leaving the application processor to focus on running
the application itself. One interesting aspect of the MAFT architecture was that it was
designed to allow different implementations for the replicas. For example, two replicas
running the same program might each have been built by a different group, and thus
they would produce slightly different results for a floating-point computation. The
MAFT system was responsible for reconciling their results [KWFT88].
Finally, the Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) is the current generation
of architectures for fault-tolerant computer systems, and is the one that this thesis de-
velops a message authentication scheme for. Like some of the earlier multi-processor
architectures, the FTPP can run multiple tasks at the same time, with each task being
run on a different group of replicated processors. For the most part, applications do not
need to be aware that they are running on a replicated system; the FTPP handles the job
of ensuring that they receive the same inputs. To reduce the complexity of the system,
multiple processors share a single connection to the inter-processor network [HL91].
Chapter 3 describes the FTPP architecture in greater detail.
19
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1.6.2 Previous message authentication designs
There have been several proposals for message authentication schemes for fault-tolerant
systems, a few of them from work also done at Draper Laboratory. [Ga90] proposes
using cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs) to sign messages, and considers how to imple-
ment such a scheme in hardware. [Cl94] combines CRCs with modular multiplica-
tive inverses to form another signature scheme. Finally, [St95] designs a three-node
Byzantine-resilient system called the Beetle that uses message authentication to allow it
to tolerate a fault in any one node.
This thesis builds on these previous results, and considers the problem of devel-
oping a message authentication scheme for the FTPP. In contrast to these previous pro-
posals, this thesis advocates using a cryptographically secure signature scheme for im-
plementing message authentication, and systematically evaluates several such schemes.
1.7 Overview of this thesis
This chapter introduces the work of this thesis and explains its significance. It gives a
background on real-time fault-tolerant computer systems, and highlights some of the
challenges of implementing a message authentication scheme for it.
Chapter 2 elaborates on Byzantine fault tolerance. It formally presents the
problem of reaching agreement in the presence of faults, and examines some of the
possible configurations for a fault-tolerant system.
Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of the X-38 Fault-Tolerant Parallel Pro-
cessor. It describes the features of the FTPP that the new software-based version will
need to replicate.
20
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Chapter 4 examines how message authentication can help the message-voting
process in a fault-tolerant system. It explains the requirements that a suitable signature
scheme will need to meet, and argues for the importance of cryptographic security.
Chapter 5 introduces the signature schemes themselves. It looks at RSA,
DSA, and elliptic curve DSA, as well as two schemes based on systems of multivariate
quadratic equations, SFLASH and TTS.
Chapter 6 describes the actual implementation of the signature scheme candi-
dates. It describes the optimizations that were used, then evaluates and compares the
performance of each scheme.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. It discusses the implications of the perfor-
mance results, summarizes the work of this thesis, and explores possible avenues for
future research.
21

CHAPTER 2
Byzantine Fault Tolerance
When a single standalone computer system cannot be made reliable enough to meet the
demands of an application, one solution is to use multiple redundant systems, all per-
forming the same task in parallel. The probability of all of the replicas in a redundant
system failing is lower than the probability of an unreplicated system failing, assuming
that the replicas are properly isolated from each other. Therefore, a redundant system
can better tolerate faults.
Building a redundant system is challenging, however. If a replicated system
consisting of multiple nodes is controlling a vehicle, for example, what should the
vehicle do when the nodes give it conflicting commands? One possibility is to add
yet another node, an arbitrator, to the system, and to let the arbitrator have the final
say on what to do. If the arbitrator fails, however, then the whole system fails, and thus
the resulting system is no more reliable than a single-node system. In systems where
extreme fault tolerance is needed, one possible solution is to use mechanical voting
instead: every node is connected to an actuator, and as long as the non-faulty nodes
are the majority, they can physically overpower the faulty nodes that are giving bad
commands. This solution handles the problem of conflicting outputs.
The problem of input is a little harder to solve. Consider a system with several
nodes that needs to read values from a sensor. Two designs are possible. The first is to
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give each node its own sensor. This creates the possibility that each node will read a
different value. The varying readings might cause different nodes to do different things,
eventually causing all the nodes to end up in wildly divergent states. The other possible
design is to use a single sensor, and have it send its readings to all of the nodes. However,
if the sensor is faulty, it may send different values to different nodes, again causing them
to diverge. The problem in both designs is that they need a way to make all of the nodes
agree with each other.
The problem of getting multiple nodes to agree has been formalized as one of
several problems. In the consensus problem, each node starts with its own version of
a value, and the goal to have all of the nodes agree on a single value at the end of the
process. In the interactive consistency problem [PSL80], each node again starts with its
own value, but the goal here is to have all the nodes agree on what value every node
in the system has. That is, every node should end the process with the same vector
(v1,v2,v3, . . . ), where vi is the value that the i th node started with. Finally, in the
Byzantine generals problem [LSP82], one node has a value that it wants to send to all the
other nodes; at the end of the process, all of the other nodes should agree on the value
that was sent. The challenge in each of these problems is to correctly handle the case
where some of the participating nodes are faulty.
The Byzantine generals problem is the hardest of the three, in the sense that
a solution to the Byzantine generals problem would also solve the other two prob-
lems [Fi83]: the interactive consistency problem can be solved by simply repeating the
solution to the Byzantine generals problem multiple times, making one of the nodes
be the sender each time. And once the solution to the interactive consistency problem
has finished, each node will have the same vector of values, from which each node can
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simply pick the majority value (or the mean value, or the result of any other choice
function), thereby also solving the consensus problem.
This chapter describes the Byzantine generals problem, and discusses the im-
plications that it has for building fault-tolerant systems. Although most of this thesis
focuses on the X-38 Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP), which is a fault-tolerant
computer system with a very specific architecture, this chapter aims to explore fault-
tolerant systems more broadly. It will present some of the theoretical results on fault-
tolerant systems, and will examine how different architectures give fault-tolerant sys-
tems different capabilities.
2.1 The Byzantine generals problem
The Byzantine generals problem received its name from the whimsical description
in [LSP82]:
We imagine that several divisions of the Byzantine army are camped outside
an enemy city, each division commanded by its own general. The generals
can communicate with each other only by messenger. After observing the
enemy, they must decide on a common plan of action. However, some
of the generals may be traitors, trying to prevent the loyal generals from
reaching agreement. The generals must have an algorithm to guarantee that
A. All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action.
B. A small number of traitors cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt
a bad plan.
This is the consensus problem. [LSP82] then observes that this consensus problem can
be reduced to the case where one general is the commanding general and the remaining
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generals are lieutenant generals, and the commanding general needs to send a command
to the lieutenants. Hereafter, the “Byzantine generals problem” will refer to the case
of one commander sending a command to several lieutenants, and not to the overall
consensus problem.
More formally, the problem describes a system consisting of a total of n gener-
als, counting the commander. Among these n generals, f of them may be traitorous,
including possibly the commander. The commander has a single-bit value to send to the
lieutenants. The goal is to design a protocol to ensure that all of the loyal lieutenants
receive the value that the commander has if the commander is loyal, or to ensure that
all of the loyal lieutenants at least agree on some value at the end of the protocol if the
commander is traitorous.
A traitorous general is a general who can violate the protocol. At each step in
the protocol where a general is supposed to send a message, a traitorous general can send
any message it wants, or no message at all. Several traitorous generals can collude with
each other. Compared to earlier models for fault-tolerant systems, the Byzantine gen-
erals problem is notable because it allows faulty nodes (generals) to behave in arbitrary
ways, even to the point of actively and maliciously trying to derail the protocol.
The solvability of the Byzantine generals problem, and the complexity of the
solution, depends on the characteristics of the network the generals use for communi-
cation with each other. Some of these distinguishing characteristics include whether
the network is broadcast or point-to-point, whether the network offers synchronous
or asynchronous communication, and whether the messages sent through the network
are signed or unsigned.
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2.1.1 Broadcast versus point-to-point networks
A point-to-point network is a network that gives every general a separate link to every
other general, and each general can always tell which of its peers a message arrived from.
In contrast, the generals cannot identify the senders of messages in a broadcast network.
In a broadcast network, if the generals are not allowed to sign their messages,
agreement is impossible. A traitorous general could forge as many messages as it wants,
from whichever general it wants. A recipient who is being targeted by a traitorous
general would not be able to draw any useful conclusions from the set of messages that
it receives.
On the other hand, if in a broadcast network the generals can sign their mes-
sages in a way that a traitorous general cannot forge, then the generals can always
identify the senders of messages. Thus, message authentication can be used to make a
broadcast network act like a point-to-point one. This capability can be useful when the
number of generals becomes very large, since the number of point-to-point connections
needed grows quadratically with the number of generals. A broadcast network can have
fewer connections.
A broadcast network using signed messages is not exactly equivalent to a point-
to-point network, however, since the two types of networks have different physical
topologies, and topology does have an effect on the robustness of the system. In the
simplest broadcast network, all of the generals are connected to each other through a
single hub. In this case, the hub is a single point of failure. A more complicated and
redundant network, like the Internet, is more resilient.
For the FTPP, which has a relatively small number of nodes, a point-to-point
network makes the most sense.
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2.1.2 Synchronous versus asynchronous networks
In a synchronous network, message transmission takes a fixed and known amount
of time. In an asynchronous network, on the other hand, messages may be delayed
arbitrarily, and they may arrive out of order. The Internet can be modeled as an
asynchronous network, since there is no guarantee on how long a message will take
to arrive. Point-to-point networks, on the other hand, are usually synchronous, since
transmission on each link takes a fixed amount of time.
One of the more important theoretical results is that a single traitorous gen-
eral can prevent agreement from being reached if the network is completely asyn-
chronous [FLP85]. The traitorous general does not even need to actively send incorrect
messages; it can prevent agreement by simply falling silent at the right moment during
the agreement protocol. This theoretical result is a strong one, but it depends on the
network being completely asynchronous. For example, it forbids the generals from
having synchronized clocks, or from using any sort of timeouts. In practice, fault-
tolerant computer systems can be built on asynchronous networks if these restrictions
are relaxed.
The FTPP fortunately does not need to deal with the complexities of asyn-
chronous networks, since its processors are time-synchronized with each other, and
since it uses point-to-point links with constant transmission delays.
2.1.3 Oral versus written messages
According to the terminology in [LSP82], an oral message is one that is not signed. With
an oral message, one general cannot prove to another general that a third general said
something. Written messages are signed, so a general can use the signature to prove to
another general that the signer really did write the message.
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The distinction between oral and written messages is particularly relevant to
systems using synchronous point-to-point networks. In such a system, solutions to
the Byzantine generals problem are possible using both oral and written messages, but
solving the problem with oral messages requires a larger proportion of loyal generals
and a larger number of messages. One of the goals of this thesis is to convert the FTPP
from a system that uses oral messages to a one that uses written messages.
In a synchronous point-to-point system that uses only oral messages, [PSL80]
and [LSP82] show that agreement is possible only if n ≥ 3 f + 1, that is, the number of
traitorous generals must be strictly fewer than one-third of the total number of generals.
Furthermore, an agreement protocol must take at least f + 1 rounds, where a general
cannot send the messages for a round until it has received all of the messages from the
previous round. Finally, agreement is only possible if the connectivity of the network
is greater than 2 f ; that is, for every pair of generals i and j , there must be enough paths
between them that i and j are still connected if any two vertices in the graph of the
network are removed [Do82].
One consequence of these results is that there is no way for a set of three
generals to reach agreement using only oral messages if one of them is traitorous.
Reaching agreement is easier if the generals can use written messages. In this
case, agreement is possible for any number of generals, nomatter howmany of them are
traitorous [LSP82]. (The definition for agreement requires that all the loyal lieutenants
agree with each other, and that they agree on the value from the commander if the com-
mander is loyal. A system with only one general in it vacuously meets this definition.
A system with two generals, one loyal and one traitorous, meets this definition too,
since there is no one else for the lone loyal general to agree with.) In practice, however,
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the generals must produce a result for some external observer, and so the correct result
should be the majority result. In this case, the loyal generals must outnumber the
traitorous generals, so n ≥ 2 f + 1. Using written messages, it is possible for three
generals to reach an agreement if one of them is traitorous.
The connectivity requirements for a network using written messages is lower
too. The only requirement is that all of the loyal generals must have some way of
communicating with each other without needing to send messages through a path con-
trolled by a traitorous general. Therefore, in the network graph, the loyal generals just
need to be connected, which means that the connectivity of the network needs to be at
least f +1 [LSP82]. The minimum number of rounds is still f +1 for written messages,
however, which is the same as for oral messages [DS83].
This discussion of oral and written messages in synchronous point-to-point
systems has so far only considered the case of traitorous generals. In a real system, the
links can be traitorous as well. A faulty link may modify messages in transit, or it
may fail to deliver some of the messages altogether. However, to an outside observer, a
traitorous link is indistinguishable from the case where one of the generals at either end
of the link is traitorous. Although each link connects two generals, a single traitorous
general is sufficient to produce exactly the same effect as a faulty link. Therefore, any
protocol that can tolerate f traitorous generals can also tolerate f faulty links if none
of the generals are traitorous [Fi83].
2.2 Implications for fault-tolerant systems
Some systems can only tolerate faults that cause nodes to stop responding. A Byzantine-
resilient fault-tolerant system, on the other hand, must operate correctly even if the
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faulty nodes act like traitorous generals and actively try to thwart the agreement proto-
col. This model makes sense if the system is distributed over the Internet, and each
node is controlled by a different party, since some of the nodes may very well be
actually malicious. However, Byzantine resilience is a desirable design goal even if
the nodes are not expected to be malicious. It is very hard, perhaps impossible, to
predict all the ways in which a system may fail, and to analyze all of their consequences.
For the effects it produces, a particularly unfortunate and unexpected fault might as
well be malicious. Byzantine resilience guarantees that the system continues to operate
correctly no matter how a failed node behaves.
Designing a system to be Byzantine resilient can be more difficult than design-
ing a system to handle only specific faults. At the same time, however, a Byzantine-
resilient system is easier to analyze. By allowing the faulty nodes to behave in arbitrary
ways, the designer no longer needs to perform a case-by-case analysis of the effects
of every conceivable fault. Instead, an analysis of the system only needs to consider
whether each node has failed or not. As [WLG78] explains in its description of the
seminal SIFT fault-tolerant computer system:
The study of fault-tolerant computing has in the past concentrated on fail-
ure modes of components, most of which are no longer relevant. The prior
work on permanent “stuck-at-one” or “stuck-at-zero” faults on single lines
is not appropriate for considering the possible failure modes of modern
LSI [large-scale integration] circuit components, which can be very com-
plex and affect the performance of units in very subtle ways. Our design
approach makes no assumptions about failure modes. We distinguish only
between failed and nonfailed units. Since our primarymethod for detecting
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errors is the corruption of data, the particular manner in which the data are
corrupted is of no importance.
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CHAPTER 3
The X-38 Fault-Tolerant
Parallel Processor
The Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) is an architecture for high-performance
fault-tolerant computer systems, developed at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory.
The X-38 FTPP is one implementation of this architecture, designed for the flight con-
trol of the NASA X-38 experimental crew return vehicle. The X-38 FTPP was built
from mostly commercial off-the-shelf components, yet it achieves an availability of at
least 99.999% [RLB02].
This chapter describes the FTPP architecture and the X-38 FTPP computer
system. The description here draws from [HL91], [RLB02], [Ed02], [Bu01], and
[CDSL02].
3.1 Architecture
Applications on the FTPP run on a virtual processor, where each virtual processor is
actually a number of physical processors, each with their ownmemory, and all running
the same program. An FTPP system has multiple virtual processors, allowing it to
run several tasks simultaneously. In the X-38 FTPP, a virtual processor can consist of
between one and four physical processors.
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Figure 3-1: Conceptual architecture of the X-38 FTPP (based on the diagram in [Bu01]).
Readings from sensors are collected by the ICPs, which are not replicated. The single-
source data from each ICP is voted before being passed on to the processors of the
replicated FCP, to ensure that each processor of the FCP uses identical input. The
output from the processors of the FCP is voted again before being sent to the actuators,
which are also controlled by a set of ICPs.
As an example, the virtual processor for an instrumentation control proces-
sor (ICP) consists of just one physical processor. An ICP performs input/output with
devices outside of the FTPP, such as sensors and actuators. ICPs are not replicated, al-
though it is certainly possible to have multiple sensors connected to different ICPs mea-
suring the same quantity. The virtual processor for the flight-critical processor (FCP),
on the other hand, is replicated across four physical processors. The FCP uses the data
collected by the ICPs to perform the actual flight-control computations. Figure 3-1
illustrates how the FCP and ICPs cooperate to control a physical plant.
The physical processors that make up a virtual processor run the same program
and should have the same state, but the physical processors are not synchronized at the
machine instruction level. Instead, each processor’s clock is allow to differ slightly from
the other processors’ clocks by some tolerance amount, and the processors vote among
themselves mainly when they receive input or produce results. The different processors
that make up a virtual processor are synchronized through the sending and receiving
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Figure 3-2: Physical architecture of the current version of the X-38 FTPP. The X-38
FTPP consists of five fault-containment regions, each of which contains a single phys-
ical processor from the four-processor FCP. Each fault-containment region also con-
tains one or more ICPs, which are unreplicated. The network elements connect the
different fault-containment regions. Since the FCP consists of only four physical pro-
cessors, the fifth fault-containment region does not contain a physical processor from
the FCP. In a version of the X-38 FTPP that uses message authentication, the fifth
fault-containment region can be eliminated.
of messages.
Because of the large number of physical processors in the system, it would
be impractical to connect all of them to each other directly. Instead, the physical pro-
cessors are grouped into fault-containment regions, which are regions that are isolated
from each other, and therefore are expected to fail independently. Each of the physical
processors that makes up a virtual processor goes into a different fault-containment
region.
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The fault-containment regions are connected to each other through their net-
work elements. The network element is responsible for handling all communication,
whether it is between physical processors in the same virtual processors, or between
different virtual processors. Each fault-containment region has a network element, and
all of the network elements are connected to each other in a complete-graph topology,
with point-to-point links between every pair of network elements. The processors
interface with the network element through shared memory.
Figure 3-2 illustrates the physical architecture of the X-38 FTPP, showing the
processors, the network elements, the fault-containment regions, and the connections
between them.
The network element helps make the replicated nature of the system transpar-
ent to the applications. For the most part, an application can just assume that it is
running on a single processor. The network element makes sure that every processor
in the same virtual processor receives the same inputs.
The X-38 FTPP is largely built out of commercial off-the-shelf hardware. The
main exception is the network elements, which are implemented in custom hardware
because of the high performance required of them.
3.2 Capabilities
The X-38 FTPP provides several services to the applications that are running on it. The
most significant of these is communication.
The X-38 FTPP offers several classes of communication primitives. A Class 1
exchange is a single-round exchange for voting data among the physical processors in
a virtual processor, to ensure that all of the physical processors have the same value.
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In a Class 1 data exchange, each processor sends its version of the value to every other
processor. Then each processor takes the resulting vector of values that it receives, and
picks the majority value as the value to use. The majority value is found by performing
a bit-by-bit vote on the messages. (This is the conceptual description of the process; in
reality, it is the network elements and not the processors that send the values to each
other and vote on the results.)
A Class 2 data exchange sends a value from a single processor to a group of
processors that must be in agreement about the value. This is the classic Byzantine
commander and lieutenants problem that [LSP82] describes. A Class 2 exchange is
used for both sending data from an ICP (single physical processor) to the FCP (multiple
replicated processors), as well as for sending data from a member of the FCP to the rest
of the FCP.
The Class 2 data exchange proceeds in two rounds. The FTPP must tolerate
one fault during the process, and so it needs f + 1 = 2 rounds of message exchange, as
shown in [LSP82]. In the first round, the source processor (really its network element)
sends its value to each of the recipient processors. In the second round, the recipient
processors reflect the value that they received to each other. Finally, each recipient takes
the vector consisting of the copies of the message, and picks the majority value as the
value to use.
The specification for the current version of the FTPP requires that a Class 2
data exchange, with its two rounds of messages, be completed in 200 µs. A less stringent
requirement is that the system has at most 1ms to make all of the needed data available
to the tasks that run every 20ms, which is the highest rate at which tasks are scheduled
on the FTPP.
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The FTPP provides several other services in addition to communication. It
manages the startup process, during which it detects which processors are available, and
puts them into a synchronized state. It schedules the tasks that run on each processor
according to their priority and the frequency with which they need to run. It maintains
a distributed clock across the multiple fault-containment regions, providing a consensus
value for the current time to applications that need it. It also detects and reports the
faults that occur.
3.3 Fault handling
The FTPP has multiple layers of fault detection, masking, and recovery. It performs
self-testing to detect internal errors. It also uses voted message exchanges, as described
earlier, to mask faults that affect any single processor.
The FTPP is designed to handle two non-simultaneous Byzantine faults. Here,
a fault is defined as a failure of one fault-containment region in any way. Two non-
simultaneous faults means after the first failed fault-containment region has been de-
tected and isolated, the system can continue to operate correctly if a second fault-
containment region fails. Of course, there is no guarantee that the system can always
identify which fault-containment region has failed and remove it. If a second fault-
containment region fails before the system can identify the first failure, then the two
failures are considered simultaneous, and thus are beyond the scope of the system.
The requirements for the X-38 FTPP call for handling only one fault at a time.
Making the system tolerate two simultaneous faults would be costly. As [LSP82] shows,
in a system that uses non-authenticated messages, handling two simultaneous faults
would require 3 f +1= 7 fault-containment regions. Connecting all 7 fault-containment
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regions to each other would require 21 links. Furthermore, performing a single-source
message exchange would require f + 1= 3 rounds of messages. Requiring that the two
faults be non-simultaneous strikes a good balance between robustness and cost.
Even though the largest virtual processor only has four physical processors, the
X-38 needs five fault-containment regions to handle two non-simultaneous faults. (With
five regions, after the first one fails and is removed, the system will have four regions
left, which is the 3 f + 1 regions that are needed to handle the next fault.) The fifth
fault-containment region is degenerate in the sense that it only exists to participate in
the message-voting process. If the X-38 FTPP had used authenticated messages instead,
this fifth fault-containment region would not be needed.
When a fault does occur, the FTPP has several ways of dealing with it. The
FTPP can reset the link between a pair of fault-containment regions, which often helps
to clear up a transient error. It can remove a physical processor from a virtual processor,
degrading the virtual processor to run with one fewer processor. If the processors vote
to do so, the FTPP can reboot a faulty processor. The FTPP can also rewrite the failed
processor’s memory with a good copy, and reintegrate the processor into its virtual
processor.
3.4 A new software-based FTPP
The current version of the X-38 FTPP uses custom hardware for its network element.
However, it would be preferable to build the FTPP entirely out of commodity compo-
nents, and to perform the functions of the network element with software. A software
implementation is easier to build and change, and it would reduce the number of parts
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that can fail. Therefore, Draper Laboratory is engaged in a project to build a new
software-based FTPP, a project of which this thesis is part.
Along with the move to a software implementation of the network element,
several other improvements will happen. First, the FTPP will get updated with newer
and faster hardware. The faster hardware will enable the network elements to sign
the messages that they send, which in turn will allow the system to use just four fault-
containment regions instead of five. Also, the new version of the FTPP may use a
partitioned operating system, which provides very strong separation between processes
running on the same processor. This would allow the new FTPP to use a single proces-
sor to perform the work of several.
Moving to a software-based system introduces several new challenges as well.
Implementing the network element in software means that less of the processor’s time
is available for other tasks. A software implementation must ensure that it does not add
too much overhead. Signing messages to implement message authentication adds to the
load on the processors too; this thesis is an attempt to find an acceptably efficient sig-
nature scheme. Finally, a software-based version of the network element will need new
implementations of the communication and time-synchronization protocols, which is
a problem that is addressed in the contemporaneous thesis [St06] by Reuben Sterling.
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Message Authentication
The current version of the X-38 Fault Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) does not dig-
itally sign the messages sent between the network elements. One of the tasks in the
development of the new software-based version of the FTPP is to add message authen-
tication using digital signatures. Authenticated messages prevent a network element
from lying about what it heard from another network element, thereby allowing the
design of the FTPP to be simplified. Whereas the current version of the FTPP needs
five fault-containment regions, a version using message authentication can achieve the
same reliability with just four fault-containment regions.
This chapter explains how the addition of message authentication allows the
number of fault-containment regions to be reduced by one. It shows that only single-
source messages need to be signed, and only by the original sender. It argues that the
message authentication scheme must be cryptographically secure, even though a faulty
processor is certainly not expected to actually attempt to break the scheme. Naturally,
cryptographically secure schemes are more resource-intensive, which conflicts with the
constraint of limited computational power. Finally, this chapter looks at some of the
intricacies involved in implementing a secure message authentication scheme, such as
the challenges of random number generation and the need to prevent message replays.
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4.1 How message authentication helps
It must be emphasized that themain goal of addingmessage authentication is to simplify
the design of the FTPP, by reducing the number of fault-containment regions from five
to four, while still maintaining the same level of fault tolerance. Although message
authentication also helps to detect random message corruption during transmission,
detecting transmission errors is not the main reason for adding message authentication
to the FTPP. In any case, the current version of the FTPP, without message authen-
tication, is a robust fault-tolerant system, and therefore already has mechanisms for
insuring message integrity.
Without message authentication, a system needs at least four nodes to tolerate
a Byzantine fault in any single node [LSP82]. Therefore, a five-node system is needed
to tolerate two non-simultaneous faults: after the first faulty node is detected and re-
moved, the remaining system is a four-node system that can tolerate the second fault.
(As mentioned earlier, however, there is no guarantee that the system can identify and
remove the node experiencing the first fault. If the system cannot, then the second fault
would be simultaneous with the first, and two simultaneous faults fall outside the speci-
fications of the system. This is a limitation of the FTPP both with and without message
authentication.) This section shows how message authentication enables a three-node
system to tolerate one fault, thereby making a four-node system sufficient to tolerate
two non-simultaneous faults.
4.1.1 Multi-source exchanges
Multi-source (Class 1) exchanges do not benefit frommessage authentication. In a multi-
source exchange, every node presumably has the same value, and the nodes perform a
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single-round message exchange to verify that they do in fact have the same value. Each
node sends its value to the others, then chooses as the final result the value that the
majority of the nodes sent.
This one-round exchange for multi-source messages can tolerate one faulty
node for any system with n ≥ 3 nodes, without needing authenticated messages: in
a three-node system, each of the two non-faulty nodes will have its own copy of the
message as well as the copy from the other non-faulty node, which makes a majority
among three copies. Adding more nodes while still limiting the system to one faulty
node obviously makes the majority more overwhelming.
4.1.2 Single-source exchanges
In a single-source (Class 2) exchange in an n-node system, one node wants to send a
value to the other n − 1 nodes. If the sender is not faulty, then at the conclusion of
the exchange, all the recipients must have the value that the sender actually sent. If the
sender is faulty, all the recipients must at least arrive at the same value at the end of the
exchange.
Without message authentication, no protocol can solve this problem in a three-
node system. Consider a three-node system consisting of nodes A, B , and C , where
node A is the sender. For simplicity, this analysis will assume that the values to be sent
are single-bit. In case (i) of Figure 4-1, the sender A is attempting to send the value 1.
Node C is the faulty node, and it insists to node B that A sent a 0. Since the sender A is
not faulty, node B , which is also not faulty, is required to conclude that A sent a 1.
However, node B has no way of knowing that node C was the faulty node.
Had the sender A been faulty instead, as illustrated in case (ii) of Figure 4-1, node B
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Figure 4-1: A three-node system with a single faulty node.
would have observed exactly the same thing. Therefore, in case (ii), node B would also
conclude that the sender A sent a 1. Since all the non-faulty nodes in the system must
come to the same conclusion, the non-faulty node C must also conclude that a 1 was
sent in this situation.
NodeC , in turn, cannot distinguish case (ii) of Figure 4-1 from case (iii), where
node B is the faulty node. Therefore, in case (iii), node C would also conclude that the
sender A sent a 1. But this conclusion is wrong, since node Awas not faulty, and it was
actually attempting to send a 0 instead.
These examples show that a three-node system cannot tolerate a single faulty
node if the system does not use authenticated messages. A more rigorous proof is
presented in [PSL80].
Adding message authentication fixes this shortcoming, and enables a three-
node system to tolerate one fault. Using message authentication, a single-source ex-
change proceeds in two rounds: in the first round, the sender node signs its message,
then sends it to all the other nodes. Then in the second round, the recipient nodes
reflect the signed message they received to each other. Each recipient node should there-
fore end up with multiple copies of the message. The recipient nodes use the majority
among the copies with valid signatures as the definitive version of the message from
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the sender. (If there is no majority, the recipient nodes use a predetermined tiebreaker
value instead.) Note that only the original sender node needs to sign the messages that
it sends. The recipient nodes do not need to sign the message again when they reflect it
to each other.
A case-by-case analysis shows why this protocol is correct. This protocol can
tolerate one fault; therefore, either the sender node or one of the recipient nodes can be
faulty. If the sender is faulty, then it may send different messages (validly or invalidly
signed) to different recipients, or it may fail to send a message at all to some of the recip-
ients. However, since only one faulty node is allowed, a faulty sender node implies that
none of recipient nodes is faulty. Therefore, each of the recipient nodes will faithfully
reflect the message it receives from the sender to each other. Every recipient node thus
ends up with an identical set of messages. Taking the majority among this set gives each
recipient node the same final value.
The other case is if one of the recipient nodes is faulty. A faulty node cannot
forge messages, so the faulty recipient node can either fail to reflect the message from
the sender, or it can reflect an invalidly signed message. The other non-faulty recipient
nodes will simply ignore the invalidly signed reflections. Since the sender node is not
faulty, the validly signed messages that each non-faulty recipient node ends up with will
all be the same, and each recipient node is guaranteed to have at least one validly signed
copy of the message. Therefore, when the recipient nodes take the majority among the
copies with valid signatures, they will all come to the same value.
4.1.3 Authenticators instead of signatures
Signing and verifying messages using digital signatures is slow. True digital signatures
use a different key for the signing and the verification process; as a result, anyone with
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the public key can verify signatures, but only the possessor of the secret key can gener-
ate them. The cost of this flexibility is that signature schemes require a certain level of
mathematical complexity, which makes them slow.
Message authentication codes (MACs) are an alternative to digital signatures.
Like a signature, the MAC of a message is a function of the message and a secret key.
Thus, a valid MAC can only be produced by someone who knows the secret key. Un-
like signatures, however, the same secret key is used to verify the MAC. Because MACs
are symmetric-key systems, signing and verifying messages using MACs is orders of
magnitude faster than using public-key signatures. The tradeoff is that MACs cannot
be used to prove that a message is authentic to a third party who does not know the
secret key. Giving everyone a copy of the secret key is not an option either, since
everyone would then be able to compute and forge MACs, making them useless for
authentication.
One possible solution is to have a separate secret key for every pair of nodes
in the system. This would allow any node to send authenticated messages to any other
node in the system. If a sender node needs to allow several recipient nodes to verify
a message, the sender node can append multiple MACs to the message, one for each
recipient node. This vector of MACs is called an authenticator. [CL99a] and [CL99b]
propose using authenticators instead of public-key signatures in fault-tolerant computer
systems.
Unfortunately, authenticators cannot replace public-key signatures in the new
version of the FTPP. Specifically, authenticators do not allow a three-node system to
tolerate one faulty node. Therefore, authenticators cannot help reduce the number of
fault-containment region the FTPP needs.
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Figure 4-2: A three-node system using authenticators.
The key difference between authenticators and public-key signatures is that an
authenticator cannot be used to prove to another party that a message is valid. A faulty
sender node could generate an authenticator that contains valid MACs for some of the
recipient nodes, but invalid MACs for the others. Thus, different recipients nodes can
receive the samemessage with the same authenticator and come to different conclusions
about its validity.
Figure 4-2 illustrates why authenticators are not sufficient for tolerating one
faulty node in a three-node system. The system consists of the nodes A, B , and C ,
where A is the sender node. In case (i), the sender A is non-faulty, and sends a 1 with a
valid authenticator to the recipients nodes B and C . Node C is faulty, and it reports to
node B that the sender sent a 0 with an invalid authenticator instead. Since node B is
non-faulty, it is required to agree with what the sender actually sent; therefore, node B
ignores the false report from node C , and concludes that the sender sent a 1.
In case (ii) of Figure 4-2, the sender node A is the faulty one instead. It sends
to each recipient node an authenticator that has a valid MAC for one node, but not for
the other. To node B , case (ii) is indistinguishable from case (i). Thus, node B will again
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conclude that the sender sent a 1 in case (ii). Since node C is also not faulty, it must
agree with node B ; therefore, node C also concludes that a 1 was sent. Node C in turn
cannot distinguish case (ii) from case (iii), so node C will conclude that a 1 was sent in
case (iii) as well. This conclusion is wrong, however, since the sender Awas not faulty,
and it had actually sent a 0 instead.
4.1.4 What message authentication does not do
The main goal of adding message authentication is to reduce the FTPP from five fault-
containment regions to four, and to do this, only the sender node in a single-source
exchange needs to sign its messages. If the goal is to also guard against random corrup-
tions to the messages while they are in transit, then the recipient nodes should sign
the messages as well when they reflect the messages to each other. However, signing
and verifying messages is slow, and thus should be done as sparingly as possible. Other
mechanisms can be used to guard against random message corruption instead.
Another job that message authentication does not do is to catch all faulty nodes.
Message authentication can detect that a faulty node exists somewhere in the system,
but it cannot identify which node it is. If a recipient node claims that it received a
message with an invalid signature, there is no way to determine whether the sender
node is actually faulty, or whether the recipient node is lying. Message authentication
does not give the system any additional power to identify and remove faulty nodes.
4.2 The need for cryptographic security
Because computational power and processor time are so dear in an embedded system, it
is very tempting to skimp on the cryptographic security of the message authentication
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scheme, and choose a fast but insecure one instead. After all, the nodes in the system
are not malicious, and it is inconceivable that they would actively attempt to break
the scheme. Perhaps a fault-tolerant system only needs to guard against random alter-
ations to the messages and signatures. Several previous theses have taken this approach,
proposing to use cryptographically insecure schemes for message authentication. This
section will show that insecure schemes are can often be broken by simple and plausible
random faults. They are therefore unsuitable even if the faulty nodes are not actively
malicious.
As an example, consider the signature scheme proposed in [St95]. Like most
signature schemes, this one follows the classic hash-and-sign paradigm. The hash func-
tion is a simple checksum: it splits the message into 32-bit chunks, and computes the
32-bit sum of those chunks. Then the signature function takes the checksum, and mul-
tiplies it by the secret key k (mod 232), where k is a 32-bit odd number. To verify the
signature, the recipient multiplies the signature by the public key k−1 (mod 232), and
compares the result to the checksum of the message.
This signature scheme is certainly very fast. On a typical processor, hashing
would take one instruction for every four bytes of the message, and signing would take
just a single additional instruction. Verifying the signature is equally quick. However,
this scheme is insecure against both message corruption and outright forgery. In fact, it
is easy to conceive how a forgery might happen:
Imagine that a fault-tolerant system is performing a single-source message ex-
change. The sender node has just sent its signed message to all of the recipient nodes,
and the recipient nodes are about to reflect themessage they received to each other. As it
is retransmitting the message, one of the recipient nodes becomes faulty, and a single-bit
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error in its processor’s cache circuitry causes the node to swap two of the 32-bit words
in the message. However, the checksum remains the same for this corrupted message,
and the signature therefore remains valid. This failure of the signature scheme violates
the requirement that no recipient node can forge a message from the sender node, and
causes the message-voting protocol to yield the wrong result.
Perhaps a slightly more secure hash function can fix this problem. [Cl94] pro-
poses using a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) instead of a checksum, while still using
modular multiplication for the signature function. A CRC is more robust against
message corruption than a checksum [PB61]. It can detect minor random changes
to the message with high probability. However, when a node fails, the message corrup-
tions that it produces may not be randomly distributed over the space of all possible
messages. This means it is incorrect to assume, for example, that a 32-bit CRC has a
1/232 probability of missing a corrupted message. Determining the actual probability
would require a careful analysis of the CRC implementation itself. For example, in one
common version of the CRC algorithm, left-shifting a message by some number of bits
causes the CRC of the message to shift by the same number of bits (assuming that the
upper bits of the CRC are zero). Therefore, if a node develops a fault that causes it to
bit shift received messages and their CRCs before retransmitting them, the node will
be able to forge corrupted messages that cannot be detected by the CRCs.
The modular multiplication used as the signature function is not immune to
forgeries by random faults either. Since bit shifts are multiplications, modular mul-
tiplication suffers from the bit-shift vulnerability as well. A more complex failure
is that if a function to compute multiplicative inverses exists somewhere in memory
(such a function is needed to generate the key pair), then a faulty node might call the
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function on another node’s public key by accident, thereby generating the other node’s
secret key. The faulty node could then use the spuriously generated secret key to forge
messages. Even if the key generation function is omitted from memory, the system
is still not safe against this mode of failure. The algorithm to compute multiplicative
inverses is quite simple, and machine instructions implementing this algorithm may
appear within some other function that was written to perform a completely unrelated
task. Theymay even appear inside data. A hardware fault could cause these instructions
to be called, and cause a faulty node to forge signatures. Granted, the chance of such
a fault happening is extraordinarily low. However, without a thorough analysis of
the entire system, it is impossible to say whether the probability is low enough to be
negligible.
As the final example of a cryptographically insecure message authentication
scheme, consider the one proposed in [Ga90]. This scheme combines hashing and
signing into a single function. Like the previous scheme, this scheme hashes the message
using a CRC. Rather than using a separate function to sign the hash, however, this
scheme instead assigns a different CRC polynomial to each node. The CRC polynomial
serves as the key, and it is used for both signing and verification, making this scheme a
symmetric signature scheme. Symmetric signatures schemes are particularly vulnerable
to forgeries, since every node has the keys needed to forge signatures from every other
node. If the nodes store the CRC polynomials in an array, for example, a fault during
array index calculations could generate a forgery.
From these examples, it is clear that a Byzantine-resilient fault-tolerant system
needs cryptographically secure message authentication. The fear is not that a faulty
node might become malicious and deliberately attempt to forge signatures. However, a
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signature scheme that is vulnerable to deliberate forgeries is also vulnerable to accidental
forgeries. Some of the scenarios that lead to accidental forgeries are more likely than
others, but a design that uses cryptographically insecure signatures would have to con-
sider them all, and make sure that the probability of each one happening is sufficiently
low. It may not even be possible to enumerate all the possible ways a forged message
could be generated.
Using a cryptographically insecure message authentication scheme would re-
quire extensive failure-modes and effects analysis (FMEA), which is precisely what a
Byzantine-resilient design aims to avoid. A cryptographically secure scheme, on the
other hand, promises that there is no conceivable way a faulty node can produce a
forged message in any feasible amount of time. No signature scheme is perfect, of
course, and there is always a possibility that a node could fail in an extraordinarily
unlikely way, generating a successful forgery by sheer luck, but the chances of this
happening are much slimmer than the chances of the other ways the system could fail.
It is also possible that a faulty node might break a cryptographically secure signature
scheme in a way that is currently unknown to any cryptographer, but one hopes that
faith in the science of cryptography is justified.
4.3 Message authentication design considera-
tions
A cryptographically secure hash and signature function form the core of a message
authentication scheme. However, to design a secure message authentication scheme for
communication in a fault-tolerant system, other considerations need to be taken into
account as well:
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4.3.1 Preventing message replays
Cryptographically secure signatures prevent a faulty node from forging messages. Sig-
natures do not prevent a node from storing a validly signed message from another node
and retransmitting it later over and over again, however, since the signature remains
valid.
The solution to this problem is to make messages expire so that they cannot
be replayed. One way to make messages expire is to include a counter in the messages.
The counter increases with each message sent, so no message should ever be repeated.
The signature is calculated over the entire message, including the counter, to prevent a
faulty node from forging the counter on a replayed message.
A side benefit of adding a counter to the messages is that it helps keep the nodes
of the system synchronized. If the counter skips a number, for example, the recipient
node can conclude that either it has missed a message or the sender node is faulty.
4.3.2 Randomness
Many signature schemes—including all the ones evaluated in this thesis—need a source
of randomness during the calculation of the signature. In some schemes, good random-
ness is critical. For example, DSA (described in section 5.4) needs a randomly generated
nonce for each message to be signed. If the same nonce is ever used for two different
messages, the recipient can deduce the signer’s secret key. In fact, even if only a few bits
of the nonce can be predicted, an adversary can discover the signer’s secret key given
enough signed messages [BGM97, HS01, NS02].
Generating random numbers is hard. A cryptographically secure random num-
ber generator needs to generate a stream of random numbers that an adversary can-
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not predict, even after having observed portions of the stream. The standard ran-
dom number generators supplied with most programming languages and libraries are
not cryptographically secure. One option is to add a special hardware device for ran-
dom number generation, but this option is often infeasible. On desktop computers,
cryptographically secure random number generators generally use the timings of in-
terrupts, hard drive head movements, keystrokes, and mouse movements as a source
of entropy [ESC05]. Unfortunately, timings are an unsuitable source of entropy in a
real-time fault-tolerant system. The clocks in all of the nodes are tightly synchronized
with each other, so they can hardly be considered unpredictable. Furthermore, if the
system is operating correctly, each of the nodes should receive exactly the same inputs
and interrupts. For random number generation in fault-tolerant systems like the FTPP,
a different source of entropy is needed.
One solution is to simply include a “pool” of entropy in each node. Each
node would be programmed with a small number of random bytes generated externally.
These random bytes would serve as the seed to a cryptographically secure expansion
function that can output as many new random bytes as the node needs. As long as the
nodes do not know the contents of each other’s entropy pools, the random numbers
generated this way are cryptographically secure and unpredictable.
4.3.3 Collision resistance of hashes
The signature function in most signature schemes expect an input of a fixed length.
However, the messages to be signed can be arbitrarily long. In practice, therefore,
signature schemes typically hash the messages first, then compute the signatures on
the fixed-length hashes.
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Like the random number generator and the signature function itself, the hash
function also needs to be cryptographically secure. Given the hash of a message, a faulty
node must not be able to find another message with the same hash, since the other
message with the same hash would be a forgery. Finding a new message that yields a
given hash is called a preimage attack; all cryptographically secure hash functions must
be preimage resistant.
For most applications, there is a second attack on the hash function that must
be prevented: the collision attack. Even if inverting the hash function for a given hash
is difficult, it may be easy to find two distinct messages with the same hash, when the
desired hash is not fixed. Because of the so-called “birthday paradox” (the counterintu-
itive result that, in a group of just 23 people, the probability of at least two of them
having the same birthday exceeds 50%), finding a collision takes about the square root
as much work as finding a preimage, even for cryptographically secure hash functions.
This means that a collision-resistant hash must be twice as long as a merely preimage-
resistant hash, against an adversary with the same computational power.
For example, one might posit that a faulty node can compute one million
hashes per second. Then in one year of operation, the node has a 1/584,942 chance of
finding a preimage to a 64-bit hash, which is an acceptably low probability. To achieve
the same resistance against collisions, however, the hash would need to be 128 bits long.
Fortunately, for the message-voting process, collision resistance is not needed.
In a single-source message exchange, if the sender is faulty, it may send different validly
signed messages to different recipient nodes. The message-voting process can already
deal with this misbehavior, so whether or not the messages have the same hash gives
the sender no additional power to undermine the message-voting process. And if a
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recipient node is faulty, it still cannot forge signatures from the sender node, so it too
has no use for hash collisions. Therefore, the hash function for message authentication
does not need to be collision resistant, and thus can use shorter hashes.
That said, there are no cryptographically secure hashes in common use that are
only preimage resistant, but not collision resistant.∗ Therefore, a system that needs a
cryptographically secure hash function will have to settle for the longer and somewhat
slower collision resistant hashes, whether collision resistance is needed or not.
4.3.4 Key management
In some distributed computer systems where nodes join and leave the system frequently,
key management is a major problem. If the nodes do not know each other’s public keys
beforehand, and if there is no trusted authority to vouch for every node’s key, then
the nodes must use some key exchange protocol to distribute their keys to each other.
However, since a faulty node may try to give different public keys to different nodes,
the key exchange protocol itself must be fault tolerant. Therefore, the key management
problem turns into another agreement problem.
Fortunately, key management for the FTPP will be much easier. The builders
of the system can simply generate the keys for each fault-containment region before-
hand, and load them into the processors’ memory along with the program code and
data.
∗Actually, the MD5 hash function [Ri92] is in fact preimage resistant but not collision resistant
in practice [WFLY04], but this weakness was not intentional. In any case, although MD5 produces
relatively short hashes compared to other popular hash functions, the hashes are still longer than they
would be if MD5 only needed to be preimage resistant.
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CHAPTER 5
Signature Schemes
A digital signature guarantees that the message it accompanies genuinely came from the
sender. True digital signatures are a function of both the message itself and a secret piece
of information that only the sender knows. Signatures therefore serve two purposes.
Like checksums, CRCs, and hashes, signatures ensure message integrity. If the message
is modified, the signature will not be valid anymore, and the recipient will detect that
the message has been corrupted. Unlike checksums and hashes, however, signatures
also guarantee authenticity: since only the signer knows its secret key, no one else can
forge messages from the signer. Both of these properties are needed in a fault-tolerant
computer system that depends on authenticated messages.
This chapter describes the various signature schemes that were considered for
the new software-based version of the Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP). RSA
and DSA are signature schemes based on the modular exponentiation of large integers.
Elliptic curve DSA is an analogue of DSA based on the multiplication of points on an
elliptic curve over a finite field. Finally, SFLASH and TTS are signature schemes based
on multivariate quadratic equations.
This chapter first gives an overview of how digital signatures work, then pro-
ceeds to introduce the signature schemes themselves.
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5.1 Overview of digital signatures
The digital signature schemes described here are public-key signature schemes. This
means that the process of signing a message and the process of verifying the resulting
signature use distinct keys. The secret key (also called the private key) is used for signing,
and the public key is used for signature verification. The secret key is known only to the
signer, whereas the public key is known to everyone who needs to verify the signatures.
In a system with multiple nodes, all of which need to sign messages, every node would
have its own pair of secret and public keys. One of the requirements for a secure digital
signature scheme is that there should be no way for an adversary to deduce the secret
key, even if the adversary has access to the public key and a large number of signed
messages.
Generically speaking, a digital signature scheme consists of three parts: key
generation, message signing, and signature verification. Key generation produces a key
pair consisting of a secret key and a public key. Message signing takes a message and
a secret key, and produces the signature. Signature verification takes a message, its
signature, and a public key as inputs, and indicates whether the signature is valid for
the given message and public key.
A secure signature scheme is invulnerable to forgery. Without the secret key,
an adversary should not be able to produce any message-signature pair such that, under
the corresponding public key, the signature is valid for the message. This forgery re-
sistance implies that digital signatures also ensure message integrity, since a corrupted
message with a valid signature would be a forgery. For message authentication in the
FTPP, both properties are useful, but forgery resistance is the main goal, and detection
of message corruption is a beneficial side effect.
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The signing function in most signature schemes typically takes a message of a
short, fixed length as the input. This length is usually much shorter than the length
of the messages the system actually wants to send. One possible solution is to break
the message up into many segments, and sign each segment individually. However,
signature functions are slow, so it is best to sign as few times as possible. The solution
used in practice in most systems is to hash the message first, then use the fixed-length
hash as the input to the signature function. To maintain the forgery resistance and
message corruption detection properties of the signature, it must be difficult for an
adversary to generate a (new) message that has a given hash. Suitable hash functions
include MD5 [Ri92] and SHA-1 [FIPS 180-1].
Because all of the signature functions considered here are complex mathemati-
cal functions, it is very difficult to say exactly how secure they are. The best estimates
are merely educated guesses.∗ The mathematical objects used in these signature schemes
have a lot of structure, so the best attacks are faster than brute force. For example,
there are obviously faster ways to factor an integer than trying to divide the integer by
every number less than it. Thus, the security level of a signature function is not just a
straightforward function of its key size.
The problem of evaluating the security of these signature schemes is made even
more complicated by the fact that the schemes are very different from each other, so it is
difficult to compare them directly. Therefore, to enable the evaluation of these schemes,
their estimated security level is usually expressed as the number of operations needed to
break an equally secure (symmetric) encryption function by brute force. For example,
∗Note, however, that all of these signature functions are believed to be cryptographically secure.
The security level of these schemes, which cryptographers are trying to quantify, is not a choice between
“easy to forge” and “hard to forge,” but rather a choice between “very hard to forge” and “astronomically
hard to forge.”
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if a signature scheme has a security level of 264, then forging a signature is about as
difficult as breaking an encryption function with 64-bit keys. If a processor can try
one million keys per second, then in a year of continuous operation, it has a 1/584,942
chance of finding the correct 64-bit key for the encryption function. Therefore, this
1/584,942 probability is also taken to be the probability of forging a signature in a year’s
time for a signature scheme with a security level of 264. This probability is acceptably
low, but to include a safety margin, most applications specify a security level of at least
280. All of the signature schemes considered here claim to meet this level of security.
5.2 Notation
In the signature schemes described here, m generally denotes a message to be signed,
and σ is the resulting signature. SK is the secret key, and PK is the public key. A
signing function is represented as signSK(m), and the signature verification function is
verifyPK(m,σ). Finally, hash(m) denotes a hash function applied to a message. The
variables in some signature schemes such as DSA have conventional names popularized
by standards documents; the presentation here will try to follow those conventions.
When manipulating messages and bit strings, x ⊕ y means the exclusive-or of
x and y, and x ‖ y denotes the concatenation of x and y. The length of a string x is
denoted by |x|.
5.3 RSA
RSA [RSA78], named after its inventors R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, is a
widely-used signature scheme that operates by performing modular exponentiations
60
EECS M.Eng. September 2006 Chapter 5: Signature Schemes
on large integers. (RSA can also be used as a public-key encryption scheme.) It is
conjectured, but not proven, that forging RSA signatures is as hard as factoring large
integers. RSA can use keys of arbitrary length, with longer keys being more secure but
slower.
5.3.1 Key generation
RSA performs arithmetic modulo n = pq , where p and q are prime numbers. Thus,
to generate an RSA key pair, first pick large primes p and q . Conventionally, the size
of their product n is considered to be the size of the RSA key. The best known way
to forge signatures is to factor n, so n should be large enough to be infeasible to factor.
Recommendations for the size of n vary. For a security level of 280, the recommended
size ranges from 760 bits long [Si00] to 1,536 bits long [Pr03a]. Many applications have
settled on a key length of 1,024 bits. Since several factoring algorithms have a run time
that is a function of the size of the smallest factor, p and q should be approximately the
same size for maximum security. However, the difference between p and q should also
not be too small, since there are also factoring algorithms whose run time depends on
the size of the difference between the factors.
Pick a small integer e relatively prime to both p − 1 and q − 1. This is the
exponent that will be used for verifying signatures; the public key is thus PK = (n, e).
A small e makes signature verification faster, but a very small value such as e = 3 may
be insecure. For example, when e = 3, an adversary can discover half of the bits of
the secret key [Bo99]. It is not known whether any of these low-exponent weaknesses
allow forgeries in practice, but many implementations choose e ≥ 65,537 to be safe.
Finally, compute d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod lcm(p−1, q−1)). The d that solves
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this congruence can be found by the extended version of the Euclidean GCD algorithm.
Then the secret key is SK = d .
5.3.2 Signing
To sign a message m < n, compute the signature σ = md mod n. Send σ with the
message. The signature is as long as the modulus, so for 1,024-bit RSA, the signature
is 128 bytes long. RSA produces the longest signatures among the schemes considered
here. Longer signatures take longer to transmit, which is a liability when the amount
of time available is limited.
5.3.3 Verification
Compute σ e mod n, and compare the result to the original message m. The signature
is valid if the two are the same.
This verification procedure works because σ e ≡ (md )e (mod n). For every
element a ∈ Zn=pq (including the ones that are multiples of p or q), the sequence
a, a2, a3, . . . (mod n) has a period that is a divisor of lcm(p − 1, q − 1). The key gen-
eration process picked e and d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod lcm(p − 1, q − 1)), therefore,
md e ≡ mk lcm(p−1, q−1)+1 ≡ m (mod n).
5.3.4 PSS encoding
The RSA signature scheme as described is not secure against all types of forgery. Because
RSA is multiplicative, that is, sign(m1m2) = sign(m1) sign(m2), an attacker can derive
new signatures from the signatures of other messages that it has. For example, if an
attacker has the message m and its valid signature σ , the attacker can pick an arbitrary
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value x and compute the new message m′ = mx e mod n and the new valid signature
σ ′ = σ x mod n. Even more simply, the attacker can just pick any value σ ′ ∈ Zn, then
compute m′ = (σ ′)e mod n, and σ ′ will be a valid signature of m′.
The cause of this problem is that the attacker can too easily generate messages
to fit a signature. The attacker cannot choose the message that it forges, but if it just
works backwards from an arbitrarily chosen signature, it will be able to produce some
forged message. The solution to this problem is to restrict the set of messages that are
valid. If the set of valid messages is only a minuscule subset of the set of all possible
messages, then the attacker will have essentially no chance of producing a valid message
from a randomly chosen signature.
To some extent, the hash-then-sign method described earlier in the overview
already implements this solution. To review, under the hash-then-sign method, the
“message” that is the argument to the signature function is not the message itself, but
rather a hash of the message. That is, using hash-then-sign, the signature is computed as
σ = (hash(m))d mod n, rather than as md mod n. Since a secure hash function is hard
to invert, even if the attacker can forge a valid signature on some hash output hash(m),
the attacker still has no way of actually producing the message m itself. To verify
the signature, the recipient computes σ e mod n, as described before, but compares the
result to the hash of the received message instead of to the message itself.
The problem with this simple hash-then-sign scheme is that there is no proof
that this change to RSA makes it immune to forgery. The argument just presented,
although intuitive, is not a rigorous proof. The concern is mostly theoretical, but with-
out a proof of security, it is conceivable that an attacker could forge signatures, even if
the hash function is secure, and even if the RSA problem (that of performing the signing
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function without knowing the secret key) is hard to solve.∗ To produce a provably
secure signature scheme, a more complex manipulation of the message, beyond simply
hashing the message then signing the hash, is needed.
RSA-PSS is a way of signing messages with RSA that is provably secure against
forgery. It applies a more complex regimen of hashing, padding, and salting (adding
randomness) to the message to produce a signature scheme that can be proven secure,
assuming that the RSA problem is hard, and assuming that the hash function is secure.
RSA-PSS is based on, and named after, the Probabilistic Signature Scheme proposed
in [BR96]. RSA-PSS itself is described in [PKCS1v2.1], and a proof of its security is
given in [Jo01].
Under RSA-PSS as specified in [PKCS1v2.1], the message is first hashed, then
prepended with a fixed padding of eight zeros and appended with a randomly generated
salt:
m′ = 0x0000000000000000 ‖ hash(m) ‖ salt
The length of the salt is up to the implementation, but one recommendation is to make
it the same length as the hash output.
Next, hash the resulting string again, and use the result as the input to a mask-
generation function (MGF), to get the mask: mask = MGF(hash(m′)). The mask-
generation function is:
MGF(x) = hash(x ‖ c) ‖ hash(x ‖ (c + 1)) ‖ hash(x ‖ (c + 2)) ‖ . . .
where c is a four-byte counter that begins at zero. The mask-generation function out-
puts as many bytes as necessary to make |mask|+ |hash(m′)|+ 1 just shorter than the
byte length of the RSA modulus.
∗More formally, the concern is that, even though inverting hash or finding collisions in it is hard,
and even though finding x for a given y such that y = x e mod n is hard, an attacker may nevertheless be
able to find some m and σ such that hash(m) = σ e mod n, without knowing d .
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Figure 5-1: PSS encoding (based on illustration from [PKCS1v2.1]).
Then, construct the data block db = 0x0000...0001 ‖ salt, where salt is
the same salt as generated earlier. Use as many leading zeros as necessary to make db
the same length as the mask.
Finally, construct the encoded message m′′ = (db⊕mask) ‖ hash(m′) ‖ 0xbc.
(The final byte 0xbc is just for compatibility with other standards.) This encoded
message should be just shorter than the RSA modulus n. The signature is then σ =
(m′′)d mod n. Figure 5-1 illustrates the PSS encoding process.
Verifying an RSA-PSS signature is essentially performing the encoding process
in reverse. First, use the RSA verification function to recover the encoded message:
m′′ = σ e mod n. Check that the final byte of m′′ is 0xbc. The bytes immediately
before that are hash(m′). Using hash(m′), recover the mask: mask = MGF(hash(m′)).
Since the first bytes of m′′ are db⊕mask, xor-ing with the mask again recovers the data
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block db. Verify that the leading bytes of db are zeros, followed by a one. Finally, the
last bytes of db are the salt. Knowing the salt, hash the received message, and recon-
struct m′ = 0x0000000000000000 ‖ hash(m) ‖ salt. Hash the reconstructed m′
again, and make sure the result is identical to the hash(m′) embedded in the encoded
message m′′. If the signature passes all of these tests, then it is valid.
5.4 DSA
The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a public-key signature scheme specified in
the U. S. Federal Government’s Digital Signature Standard [FIPS 186-2]. Like RSA,
DSA operates by performing modular exponentiations on large integers, although the
moduli are prime rather than composite. Forging DSA signatures is widely believed to
be as difficult as solving the discrete logarithm problem, although this equivalence has
not been proven.
5.4.1 Key generation
DSA operates on a subgroup of the multiplicative group of integers modulo a large
prime p. The subgroup is generated by an element g , which has order q , a smaller
prime number. Solving the discrete logarithm problem in a group whose size is b bits
long has roughly the same difficulty as factoring a b -bit number, so a p of a certain
size offers about the same level of security as an RSA modulus of the same size [LV01].
Thus, for a security level of 280, a p of about 1,024 bits is appropriate. The size of q
should be about the same as the size of the hash function output; [FIPS 186-2] specifies
a size of 160 bits for q , since it mandates the use of the hash function SHA-1, which
also has an output of 160 bits.
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The size of the signature will be twice the size of q . DSA signatures are signifi-
cantly shorter than RSA signatures in practice.
The numbers p, q and g are system parameters in DSA: they do not necessarily
belong to any single user, as they are public and can be reused. To generate them, first
pick a prime q . Then find a larger prime p such that p − 1 is a multiple of q ; therefore,
p = aq+1 for some integer a. Next, find a generator g that will generate the subgroup:
pick an h ∈Z∗p such that ha mod p > 1, and let g = ha mod p. The subgroup generated
by g will have order q .
To generate a user’s key pair, pick a random x between 1 and q − 1, and let
y = g x mod p. Then the public key is PK = y, and the secret key is SK = x.
5.4.2 Signing
To sign the messagem, first pick a random nonce k between 1 and q−1. Then compute:
r = (g k mod p)mod q s = k−1(hash(m)+ x r )mod q
The signature is σ = (r, s). In the extraordinarily unlikely event that r or s is zero, pick
a new k and recompute the signature. Note that r and s are elements of neither Z∗p
nor its subgroup generated by g . Instead, r and s can be thought of more as exponents
to g .
It is extremely important that k be picked randomly and unpredictably. An
adversary who receives two messages with the same k can recover the signer’s secret
key! Given the two signatures
s1 = k
−1(hash(m1)+ x r1)mod q
s2 = k
−1(hash(m2)+ x r2)mod q
the adversary has two equations with two unknowns (k−1 and x). The adversary can
easily solve for the secret key x. Furthermore, if the adversary can predict even a few
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bits of k, [NS02] shows how the secret key can be recovered. An implementation of
DSA must take care to use a good random number generator.
RSA is vulnerable to trivial forgeries without PSS encoding. DSA, which al-
ready incorporates hashing into the signing process, avoids this problem, and therefore
does not need another layer of encoding.
5.4.3 Verification
To verify a signature σ = (r, s) on the message m, first check that 0 < r < q and that
0< s < q . Then compute:
u1 = s
−1 hash(m)mod q
u2 = s
−1 r mod q
v = (g u1y u2 mod p)mod q
Accept the signature as valid if v = r .
This verification procedure is correct because
g u1y u2 ≡ g (hash(m)/s mod q)y (r/s mod q) ≡ g hash(m)/s y r/s (mod p),
since g has order q . And since y = g x , the equation reduces further to
≡ g hash(m)/s g x r/s ≡ g (hash(m)+x r )/s (mod p).
Therefore, v ≡ (g u1y u2 mod p) ≡ (g (hash(m)+x r )/s mod p) (mod q). Next, as computed
by the signer, s = k−1(hash(m)+ x r )mod q , therefore, (hash(m)+ x r )/s ≡ k (mod q).
Substituting into v again yields v ≡ g k mod p (mod q). This is equivalent to r .
5.5 Elliptic curve DSA
Elliptic curve DSA (ECDSA) is a variation on DSA that replaces the multiplicative
group of integers modulo p with the group of the points on an elliptic curve over a
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finite field. The security of ECDSA is conjectured to be based on the difficulty of
the elliptic curve version of the discrete logarithm problem. ECDSA is standardized
in [ANSIX9.62], and is described in [JMV01].
DSA uses a subgroup of the multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime,
and ECDSA uses a subgroup of the group of points on the elliptic curve. ECDSA
signatures are about the same length as DSA signatures. Unlike DSA, however, the size
of the subgroup in ECDSA is typically not much smaller than the size of the entire
group. The entire group of points, in turn, has approximately the same size as the size
of the finite field over which the elliptic curve is defined. Therefore, a single number
can describe the magnitude of all three quantities. The convention is to just give the
magnitude (in bits) of the size of the finite field.
Solving the discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve is believed to be
much harder than solving the problem with integers. Therefore, ECDSA can use a
smaller group size than DSA and still achieve the same level of security. For a security
level of 280, ECDSA with a 160-bit field is estimated to be approximately as secure
as DSA with a 1,024-bit p, and as secure as RSA with a 1,024-bit modulus. For the
same level of security, ECDSA has smaller key sizes than DSA, and runs faster than
RSA [JM98].
5.5.1 Overview of elliptic curve cryptography
Performing cryptography with integers is straightforward, since all the needed math-
ematical operations are already defined. Performing cryptography on elliptic curves
requires more setup. The process for ECDSA is as follows [SEC1]:
1. Select an underlying finite field Fq . If a prime field is chosen, q = p for some
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prime p; if a binary field is chosen, q = 2m. (Fields where q = pm, for p > 2, also
exist, but they are too cumbersome to use in most cases.)
For a prime field Fp , the elements can be represented as the integers mod-
ulo p, and arithmetic on the elements is performed as the customary modular
arithmetic. For a binary field F2m , one possible representation is to treat the
elements as bit strings of length m, where the bits form the coefficients of a
(m−1)-degree polynomial. Addition and multiplication are then defined as addi-
tion andmultiplication of polynomials, except that arithmetic on the coefficients
is performed modulo 2. Since the multiplication of two polynomials produces a
longer polynomial, the resulting polynomial is shrunk back down by taking the
remainder after division with a mth-degree reduction polynomial, which also
needs to be specified.
The specification of how to represent the elements of Fq constitute the
field representation, denoted FR.
2. Define an elliptic curve E on the field. The elliptic curve is the set of points
(x, y) ∈ Fq×Fq that satisfy the curve equation. For prime fields, the equation has
the form y2 = x3+ax+b ; for binary fields, it has the form y2+xy = x3+ax2+b .
Both a and b are elements of the field, and the additions and multiplications in
the equations are field operations. The number of points that satisfy the curve
equation is denoted #E(Fq); this quantity has roughly the same magnitude as the
size of the field itself.
The points on the curve become a group when a suitable definition of
“addition” is specified for them. First, define a new zero point O , which serves as
the identity element for addition. Thus, O +O = O , and P +O = O + P = P ,
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for any point P . The point O is not an actual point on the curve itself, but it is
needed to make the group closed under addition. For a nonzero point P = (x, y),
negation is defined as −P = (x,−y) for prime fields and −P = (x, x + y) for
binary fields.
Finally, the addition of two points needs to be defined. Given the two
points P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2), where P1,P2 6= O and P1 6= −P2, their sum
is P3 = (x3, y3). For a prime field:
x3 = λ
2− x1− x2
y3 = λ(x1− x3)− y1
λ=

y2−y1
x2−x1 , if P1 6= P2
3x21+a
2y1
, if P1 = P2
where a is one of the constants that parameterizes the elliptic curve equation.
For a binary field:
x3 = λ
2+λ+ x1+ x2+ a
y3 = λ(x1+ x3)+ x3+ y1
λ=

y1+y2
x1+x2
, if P1 6= P2
x1+
y1
x1
, if P1 = P2
(The form of the equations given here differs slightly from the more customary
presentations that give separate equations for x3 and y3 depending on whether
P1 = P2. The form shown here comes from [BJ02].)
Multiplication of a point by a scalar is defined as repeated addition: that is,
kP = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
.
3. Given the group consisting of the points on an elliptic curve, pick a base point
G that generates a subgroup of size n, where n is prime. Since G generates a
subgroup, n must be a divisor of #E(Fq), the size of the entire group. Therefore,
#E(Fq) = hn, where h is the cofactor. The cofactor is generally small (h = 1 is
common); thus, the size of the subgroup is about the same as the size of the entire
group.
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To summarize, the parameters that define an ECDSA system consist of the
underlying finite field Fp or F2m of size q , the chosen field representation FR, the elliptic
curve equation parameterized by a and b , the generator G, the subgroup size n, and
the cofactor h = #E(Fq)/n.
Unfortunately, generating these system parameters is extremely complex and
time consuming. Many implementations therefore choose from a set of standardized
pre-generated parameters instead. Recommended elliptic curves and parameters can be
found in [RECFGU] and [SEC2].
5.5.2 Key generation
Given the system parameters (q ,FR,a, b ,G,n, h), pick a random integer d between 1
and n− 1. Let the point Q = dG. Then the user’s secret key is SK = d , and the public
key is PK =Q.
5.5.3 Signing
Signing with ECDSA is almost perfectly analogous to signing with DSA, with exponen-
tiation replaced by scalar point multiplication. First, pick a random nonce k between 1
and n − 1. As with DSA, k must be unpredictable by anyone else. Then to sign the
message m, compute:
r = (the x-coordinate of kG, converted to an integer)mod n
s = k−1(hash(m)+ d r )mod n
The signature is σ = (r, s). In the unlikely event that r or s is zero, pick another nonce
k and try again.
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5.5.4 Verification
To verify the signature σ = (r, s) on a message n, first check that 0 < r < n and that
0< s < n. Then compute:
u1 = s
−1 hash(m)mod n
u2 = s
−1 r mod n
V = u1G+ u2Q
If V = O , reject the signature. Otherwise, let
v = (the x-coordinate of V , converted to an integer)mod n.
Accept the signature as valid if v = r .
The proof of correctness for this verification procedure follows from the proof
of correctness of DSA, by analogy.
5.6 Multivariate quadratic signature schemes
Multivariate quadratic (MQ) cryptography is cryptography based on systems of second-
order polynomial equations of many variables. Proposals for cryptographic schemes
based on algebraic (as opposed to number-theoretic) systems have existed since at least
1983 ([IM85] surveys some of the early proposals), but none of them have attracted as
much attention as the popular schemes like RSA have. MQ signature schemes promise
to run many times faster than the other schemes described earlier. However, they have
the disadvantage of using very large keys (several kilobytes long), and they are much
harder to describe than the number-theoretic schemes. Also, many of the early MQ
schemes turned out to be insecure. The following overview of how MQ signature
schemes work draws from [WP04], [DS04], and [Wo05].
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The public key in an MQ signature scheme consists of the coefficients to a
set of polynomial functions of many variables. The signature is the values of those
variables. To verify a signature, the recipient applies the polynomial functions to the
variables, getting a set of result values. The signature is valid if the resulting values
match the received message:
PK =

p0(x) = p0(x0, x1, x2, . . . )
p1(x) = p1(x0, x1, x2, . . . )
p2(x) = p2(x0, x1, x2, . . . )
· · ·
m = (m0,m1,m2, . . . )
σ = (σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . )
Let v =
 
p0(σ), p1(σ), p2(σ), . . .

;
signature valid if v = m.
In anMQ signature scheme, the polynomial equations that make up the public
key are second-order equations. This means that each of the functions pi has the form:
pi (x0, x1, x2, . . . ) =
∑
j,k | j≤k
ζi , j,k x j xk +
∑
j
νi , j x j + ρi
In other words, the polynomial consists of the coefficient ζ times each pair of two
variables, plus the coefficient ν times each variable, plus the constant ρ. Note that the
variables and coefficients are not integers, but elements of some small finite field F. All
of the operations are field operations. The number of coefficients in each equation
grows quadratically with the number of variables, and there are many equations, so the
public key is quite large.
Solving the equations would allow an adversary to forge signatures. Fortu-
nately, solving a system of multivariate quadratic equations is NP-hard. (The earliest
proof of this, for a binary field, is attributed to a private communication from L.G. Val-
liant and to an unpublished manuscript by A. S. Fraenkel and Y. Yesha; proofs also
appear in [Wo05].) This does not imply that forging an MQ signature is NP-hard, of
course, since the difficulty of forgery depends on how exactly the coefficients of the
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equations are chosen. Nonetheless, the NP-hardness of solving multivariate quadratic
equations is evidence that MQ signature schemes may be more secure than schemes
based on factoring or the discrete logarithm problem (such as RSA or DSA), since these
latter problems have not been proven to be NP-hard.
Since solving the equations directly is NP-hard, the signer must have another
way of computing signatures. The secret key contains the polynomial functions of the
public key, but in a decomposed form that is much easier to invert.
The secret key consists of three maps, which when combined compute the
same function as the public key. The public key can be thought of as a single function
that takes an input vector (the signature) and returns another vector (the message). Each
of the three maps are also functions that take and return vectors. Thus, if verify is the
function computed by the public key, then
verify(σ) = (φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1)(σ),
where φ1, φ2, and φ3 are the three decomposed maps. To sign a message, therefore, the
signer works backwards, and computes σ =φ−11 (φ
−1
2 (φ
−1
3 (m))).
The mapsφ1 andφ3 are affine, meaning that each element of the output vector
is just a linear combination of the elements in the input vector, plus a constant. Thus,
these two maps can be written as a matrix multiplication plus a constant vector:
φ1(x) =M1x + c1 φ3(x) =M3x + c3
where M1 and M3 are matrices, and c1 and c3 are vectors. They are usually generated
randomly. The input x is also a vector. Again, the matrices and vectors contain field
elements, not integers. Since φ1 and φ3 are affine, inverting them is easy:
φ−11 (y) =M
−1
1 (y − c1) φ−13 (y) =M−13 (y − c3)
The purpose of φ1 and φ3 is to obscure the operation of the central map
φ2. Since φ1 and φ3 are linear, their combination is also linear—and a linear system
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Figure 5-2: Overview of an MQ signature scheme. The secret key consists of the maps
φ1, φ2, and φ3, and the public key is the composition φ3 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ1, given as a set
of second-order polynomial functions pi . Signing a message m is done by computing
φ−11 (φ
−1
2 (φ
−1
3 (m))). Verifying a signature σ is done by comparing verify(σ) to m, where
verify is the function specified by the public key.
of equations would be easy for an attacker to solve. Therefore, φ2 must contribute
the nonlinearity that makes the overall signature verification function quadratic. The
central map φ2 should be easy for the signer to invert, but when composed with φ1
and φ3 to give the form of the verification function in the public key, the inversion
should not be obvious anymore. Different MQ signature schemes use different types
of functions for φ2.
Thus, the signer’s secret key consists of the matrices and constant vectors that
make up the two outer maps, plus the parameters of the central map, which depend on
the MQ scheme chosen: SK = (φ1,φ2,φ3). The public key is the composed form of the
three maps: PK =φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1.
Generating the public key from the secret key is not hard. Again, the public
key consists of a vector of polynomial functions with the form:
pi (x0, x1, x2, . . . ) =
∑
j,k | j≤k
ζi , j,k x j xk +
∑
j
νi , j x j + ρi
To find the values of the coefficients, first find the ρ’s by computing φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1 on
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the zero vector x = (0,0,0, . . . ). The result is a vector giving ρi for every i . Finding
the ν’s and ζ ’s is slightly more complicated. Setting the j th element of the input vector
to 1 will yield ζi , j, j + νi , j +ρi . Setting the j th element of the input vector to a different
value k will yield ζi , j, j k2+ νi , j k +ρi . From these two results, the value of ζi , j, j and νi , j
can be solved for. Finally, find the values for ζi , j,k where j 6= k by setting every pair of
elements in the input vector to 1, one pair at a time.
Figure 5-2 summarizes the structure of an MQ signature scheme.
5.7 SFLASH
SFLASH is an MQ signature scheme designed to run on devices with limited computa-
tional power, such as smart cards. SFLASH claims to offer a security level of 280, while
running much faster than an 1,024-bit RSA. The version of SFLASH described here is
the second version of SFLASH [CGP02], called SFLASHv2 by its inventors.
SFLASH uses the finite field K = F128, specified as F2[X ]/(X 7+X + 1). The
vectors in SFLASH are 37 elements long. Therefore, M1 and M3 are 37× 37 square
matrices, and c1 and c3 are 37-element vectors, all filled with elements from K . The
signature vector σ is also 37 elements long, so SFLASHhas a signature length of 259 bits.
The public key, however, is truncated after the first 26 polynomial functions. Thus,
the verification function given by the public key is a function that maps K37→ K26.
Leaving out the last 11 polynomials from the public key presumably makes the system
more secure, since it gives the attacker fewer equations to work with. It also makes the
public key shorter.
The central map φ2 : K37→ K37 adds the nonlinearity that makes SFLASH
quadratic. It is defined somewhat unusually:
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First, let L be the extension field K[Y ]/(Y 37 + Y 12 + Y 10 + Y 2 + 1), where
K = F128 is the field specified earlier. In other words, an element x ∈ L, where x =
(x0, x1, . . . , x36), represents the coefficients of a 36th-degree polynomial, and each coef-
ficient is itself a member of K . Addition and multiplication in L are defined as the
addition and multiplication of the polynomials, with the arithmetic on the coefficients
performed in K . Since multiplying two 36th-degree polynomials yields a 72nd-degree
polynomial, the resulting polynomial is reduced modulo the reduction polynomial
Y 37+Y 12+Y 10+Y 2+1 to bring it back into L. Exponentiation is defined as repeated
multiplication.
Note that a vector from K37 can be mapped trivially to an element from L, and
vice versa: the i th element in the 37-element vector simply becomes the i th coefficient
in the 36th-degree polynomial. In an implementation, of course, both objects would be
stored as an array of values, and no actual conversion is necessary.
Given these preliminaries, the central map in SFLASH is defined as:
F (A) =A128
11+1
whereA is an element in L. That is, the central mapφ2 takes a vector fromK37, converts
it into an element A∈ L, computes A12811+1, then returns the result converted back into
another 37-element vector from K37.
Since outer mapsφ1 andφ3 are linear, the central mapφ2 must be quadratic to
make the composition φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1 be quadratic. Therefore, F (A)must scramble up the
coefficients of A quadratically: if B = F (A), where A= a36Y 36+ a35Y 35+ · · ·+ a0, and
B = b36Y 36+ b35Y 35+ · · ·+ b0, then it must be the case that bi =
∑
j,k
c j,ka jak for some
constants c j,k . But why should F (A) be quadratic at all? Conceivably, the coefficients
bi could end up as any arbitrary function of the ai’s.
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First, consider A2, where again A = a36Y 36 + a35Y 35 + · · · + a0. Then A2 =∑
i
a2iY
2i +
∑
i 6= j
2aia jY
iY j (before reduction modulo reduction polynomial). Since the
coefficients are in K , however, and since K = F128 is a binary field, 2aia j = 0. There-
fore, all the Y iY j terms where i 6= j disappear, leaving A2 = ∑
i
a2iY
2i . And since
raising something to the 128th power is just repeated squaring, A128 =
∑
i
a128i Y
128i . But
a128i = ai in F128, leading to the result A128 =
∑
i
aiY
128i . This result has not been
reduced yet, but reduction modulo the reduction polynomial is linear with respect to
the coefficients. Therefore, A128 yields a linear transformation of the coefficients.
Finally, F (A) = A12811+1 = A12811A. Since A12811 is a linear transformation of the
coefficients, multiplying by A again gives a quadratic transformation of the coefficients.
Therefore, the central map F (A) is quadratic.
5.7.1 Key generation
The secret key consists of the matrices and column vectors that define the outer maps
φ1(x) = M1x + c1 and φ3(x) = M3x + c3. So to generate the secret key, pick a pair of
random 37×37 matrices for M1 and M3, and a pair of random 37-element vectors for c1
and c3. Since signing involves the the computation ofφ
−1
1 andφ
−1
3 , the matrices M1 and
M3 must be invertible. The easiest way to generate them is to fill them with random
values and attempt to invert them, repeating until invertible matrices are obtained.
The public key consists of the coefficients of the first 26 functions of the com-
positionφ3◦φ2◦φ1, so PK =

ζi , j,k | (0≤ j ≤ k , 0≤ k < 37), νi , j | (0≤ j < 37), ρi

, for
all 0≤ i < 26. The secret key is SK = (M1, c1,M3, c3).
Note that since the last 11 polynomial functions of the compositionφ3◦φ2◦φ1
are truncated from the public key, the last 11 rows of M3 and the last 11 elements of c3
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do not affect the validity of the signatures. Also, [GSB01] points out that c1 and c3 can
be deduced from the public key; consequently, the designers of SFLASH call these two
vectors “semi-public,” as they do not actually need to be kept secret [CGP03].
5.7.2 Signing
To sign a message m, first pick a random nonce r ∈K11. In other words, r is a random
vector of 11 elements from the field K = F128. (The SFLASH specification in [CGP02]
includes a secret string ∆ in the secret key, and uses a series of hashes to combine ∆
and m to yield the nonce r . However, it is easier to just randomly generate a new r for
each signature.)
Next, hash the message: hash(m) → h, where h ∈ K26. SFLASH, like DSA,
specifies hashing the message as part of the signing process. Since the hash is 26 elements
long, and the nonce is 11 elements long, the concatenation h ‖ r is a vector in K37.
The signature is computed as σ =φ−11 (φ
−1
2 (φ
−1
3 (h ‖ r ))). The signature is also
a vector in K37. Since φ1 and φ3 are affine, inverting them is straightforward. Inverting
the central map φ2 is a more interesting process. The central map is implemented as
F (A) = A12811+1, where A ∈ L. Since the size of L is 12837, its multiplicative group has
size 12837− 1. Therefore, the inverse of F is F −1(B) = B (12811+1)−1 (mod 12837−1).
5.7.3 Verification
To verify the signature σ ∈ K37 on the message m, compute v = verify(σ), where verify
is the set of verification functions described by the coefficients in the public key. Since
the public key is truncated after the first 26 polynomial functions, v will be only 26 ele-
ments long. However, these 26 elements should exactly match the hash of the message,
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since the signature was computed on hash(m) ‖ r , and hash(m) gave a 26-element hash.
Accept the signature as valid if v = hash(m).
5.8 TTS
The Tame Transformation Signature (TTS) scheme is anMQ signature scheme that uses
a “tame-like” map for its central map. A tame-like map y = f (x), where x and y are
vectors of elements from some field, is easy to invert for explicit values for y, but giving
an expression in symbolic form for the inverse map f −1 is difficult because it would
have too many terms [CY03]. TTS claims to be even faster than SFLASH, while still
offering a 280 level of security.
Several versions of TTS have been proposed ([CYP02], [CY03], [YCC04]),
but these early versions of the signature scheme suffer from various cryptographic
weaknesses [YC04, DSY06]. The version of TTS described here is called Enhanced
TTS (20,28) or TTS/5, and is specified in [YC05]. At the time of this writing, this new
version of TTS is believed to be secure.
TTS uses the field K = F256. Like SFLASH, the output vector of the verifica-
tion function specified by the public key is shorter than the signature vector, to make
the quadratic equations harder to solve. Whereas SFLASH accomplishes this shorten-
ing by simply reducing the number of polynomial functions revealed in the public key,
TTS shortens the output in the central map itself. The input to the verification function
verify(σ) = (φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1)(σ) is 28 elements long; the output is 20 elements long, hence
the name TTS (20, 28). The dimensions of the three maps are therefore:
φ1 : K
28→K28 φ2 : K28→K20 φ3 : K20→K20
81
Authenticated Messages for a Real-Time Fault-Tolerant Computer System David Chau
The dimensions of the maps in TTS are smaller than in SFLASH, which is one of the
reasons TTS runs faster.
Following the general pattern of MQ signature schemes, TTS specifies affine
transformations for the outer maps: φ1(x) =M1x+ c1 and φ3(x) =M3x+ c3. The only
wrinkle here is that M1 and M3 have different sizes, as do c1 and c3.
The central map is more interesting. If x = (x0, x1, . . . , x27) is the input vector,
then y =φ2(x) is defined as:
yi = xi +
7∑
j=1
αi , j x j x8+(i+ j mod 9), for i = 8 . . . 16
y17 = x17+α17,1x1x6+α17,2x2x5+α17,3x3x4
+α17,4x9x16+α17,5x10x15+α17,6x11x14+α17,7x12x13
y18 = x18+α18,1x2x7+α18,2x3x6+α18,3x4x5
+α18,4x10x17+α18,5x11x16+α18,6x12x15+α18,7x13x14
yi = xi +αi ,0 xi−11 xi−9+
i−1∑
j=19
αi , j−18 x2(i− j )−(i mod 2) x j +αi ,i−18 x0 xi
+
27∑
j=i+1
αi , j−18 xi− j+19 x j , for i = 19 . . . 27
The coefficients αi , j ∈ K are part of the secret key. Notice that i starts at 8, following
the convention in [YC05], making the output vector y = (y8, . . . , y27) 20 elements long.
In this central map, each of the yi’s depends on only a few of the xi’s from the input
vector, which makes the central map easy to invert. However, the surrounding maps
φ1 and φ3 will mix the xi’s so that each of the yi’s will depend on all of the xi’s.
This central map is quadratic with respect to the the elements of the input
vector, so the composite map φ3 ◦ φ2 ◦ φ1 also quadratic. In contrast to SFLASH,
TTS is a “truer” multivariate quadratic signature scheme: whereas SFLASH’s central
map relies on the properties of an extension field of K to scramble the input vector
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quadratically, the central map in TTS directly computes a quadratic transformation of
the elements in the input vector.
5.8.1 Key generation
The secret key consists of the parameters for the outer maps φ1(x) = M1x + c1 and
φ3(x) = M3x + c3, as well as the coefficients αi , j for the central map. To create a key
pair for TTS, generate a random invertible 28×28 matrix for M1, a random 28-element
vector for c1, and a random invertible 20× 20 matrix for M3, all with elements from
K = F256. Do not generate the vector c3 yet. Also choose random values for the αi , j’s in
the central map φ2.
As a small optimization, TTS specifies that the polynomial functions in the
public key should have no constant terms—that is, ρi = 0 for all i . This optimization
reduces the size of the public key, and makes signature verification slightly faster. The
vector c3 is used to make the constant terms disappear: computing φ3 ◦φ2 ◦φ1 on the
zero vector yields the vector of ρi’s, so set c3 to make the ρi’s be zero.
The public key is PK =

ζi , j,k | (0≤ j ≤ k , 0≤ k < 28), νi , j | (0≤ j < 28)

, for
0≤ i < 20. The secret key is SK = (M1, c1,M3, c3,αi , j ), for 8≤ i < 28, with the range of
j varying for each i .
5.8.2 Signing
To sign a message m, compute the signature σ = φ−11 (φ
−1
2 (φ
−1
3 (hash(m)))), where hash
is a hash function that returns a vector in K20. The outer maps φ1 and φ3 are affine, so
inverting them is simple.
Inverting φ2 requires inverting the tame-like central map. That is, given a
vector y = (y8, . . . , y27), the signer needs to find a vector x = (x0, . . . , x27) such that
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y =φ2(x). The inversion is performed in parts. First, pick random values for x1, . . . , x7,
and solve for x8, . . . , x16. This involves solving a system of nine linear equations for
nine unknowns, which can be done by Gaussian elimination. There is a chance that
the randomly-chosen values for x1, . . . , x7 will give a system of equations that has no
solution (or too many), in which case, a new set of random values will have to be
chosen.
Next, substitute the values for x1, . . . , x16 into the equations for y17 and y18, and
solve for x17 and x18. These two equations will always be solvable. Finally, choose a
random value for x0 and solve for the nine remaining variables x19, . . . , x27. Here again,
a bad choice for x0 will render the equations unsolvable, in which case, a new value for
x0 will need to be tried.
Solving nine simultaneous equations can be done relatively quickly, so signing
with TTS is fast. The fact that the signer will occasionally generate a set of unsolvable
equations and need to retry is problematic, however. In a real-time system, operations
need to happen in a fixed amount of time, even in the worst case. Unfortunately,
the worst-case time for computing a TTS signature is infinite, since the signer may
conceivably be unlucky enough to perpetually choose values that make the equations
unsolvable.
However, the speed advantages of TTS are too compelling to immediately dis-
missing this signature scheme. As [YC05] points out, if all but one of the variables
to be randomly chosen are fixed, then at most 9 out of the possible 256 values for the
remaining variable will make the resulting system of equations unsolvable. Therefore,
the signer generates an unsolvable system of equations 9/256 of the time, at most. In
practice, a randomly-generated system of equations is solvable about 255/256 of the
time.
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Thus, although the probability of failing to generate a signature never becomes
zero, it can be made arbitrary small by budgeting more time for the signature process.
And unlike some of the other possible failures in a fault-tolerant system, the failure
probability of the signature process is fixed and known. Furthermore, failing to com-
pute the signature on time only affects the signer node; the failure does not disable the
message-voting protocol for the other nodes.
To conclude, the fact that the signature process takes a non-deterministic
amount of time is indeed a shortcoming, but it is a shortcoming that can be strictly
quantified and managed.
5.8.3 Verification
In contrast to the signing process, the signature verification process is completely deter-
ministic, and takes a fixed amount of time. The verification process for TTS is the same
as the one for SFLASH. To verify the signature vector σ on the message m, compute
v = verify(σ), where verify is the verification function specified by the coefficients in the
public key. Accept the signature as valid if v = hash(m).
85

CHAPTER 6
Implementation and Results
Adding authenticated messages to a fault-tolerant computer system allows the system
to achieve the same level of reliability with fewer nodes, making the system less costly
and reducing the number of components that can fail. A system like the X-38 Fault-
Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP) needs to send data at a very high rate; thus, the
biggest constraint on a message authentication implementation is its speed. Although
it is possible to estimate how fast a certain signature scheme will run by analyzing the
algorithms it uses, the only reliable way to evaluate its speed is to actually implement
it and time it. Therefore, this thesis implements and benchmarks each of the signature
scheme candidates.
This chapter describes the implementation of RSA-PSS, DSA, elliptic curve
DSA, SFLASH, and TTS. It explains the optimizations that were used, and reveals
how long each of these signature schemes takes to sign a message.
6.1 Existing results
One of the more comprehensive surveys of cryptographic performance is [Pr03b] from
the NESSIE project, which gives benchmarks for various signature schemes. Unfortu-
nately, the results it gives are somewhat hard to interpret, as they are a combination
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Scheme
Signing
time (ms)
Verification
time (ms) Source
RSA-PSS 40.5 4.5 [Pr03b, table 13]. 1,024-bit n, e = 3. Nor-
malized from a Pentium Celeron running at
450MHz.
DSA 7.9 17.4 [Da04]. 1,024-bit p. Signing uses precomputa-
tion. Normalized from a Pentium 4 running
at 2.1GHz.
ECDSA 16.9 22.7 [Pr03b, table 37]. 163-bit binary field. Nor-
malized from cycle count on Pentium 3.
SFLASH 4.5 1.3 [Pr03b, table 13]. Normalized from a Pen-
tium 3 running at 500MHz.
TTS 0.1 0.2 [YC05]. Normalized from a Pentium 3 run-
ning at 500MHz.
Table 6.1: Performance of signature schemes from various previously published bench-
marks. Times are normalized to a processor running at 300MHz. Because these bench-
marks were performed on different architectures, these results are only useful for a very
rough comparison of the signature schemes.
of cycle counts for various processor/compiler combinations and submitter-supplied
timings on heterogeneous architectures. Also, DSA was not evaluated. Another source
of performance data is [Da04], which gives benchmarks for the cryptographic primi-
tives implemented in the Crypto++ library. Finally, the papers proposing the various
signature schemes often make performance claims as well.
Although comparing benchmarks performed on different architectures and
obtained from different sources is dubious, having a baseline for evaluating the imple-
mentations described in this chapter is still useful. Table 6.1 presents the signature
scheme timings collected from the various sources. Each of the signature schemes in
the table claims a security level of at least 280. The timings in this table are normalized
to a processor running at 300MHz by simply scaling the timings from the sources
according to the frequencies of the processors used by the sources. The frequency of
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300MHz was chosen because the processor used for the implementations described in
this chapter also runs at 300MHz.
The existing benchmarks for the five signature schemes evaluated here come
from different sources that used different processors, compilers, and programming lan-
guages. As a result, the timings in Table 6.1 give only a very rough comparison of how
the signature schemes perform. One of the contributions of this thesis is that it will
present benchmarks of the all of the signature schemes on a single platform, allowing a
more valid comparison of the signature schemes.
6.2 Testing platform
The signature scheme implementations described in this chapter were tested on an Em-
bedded Planet 405 single-board computer [EP405] with a PowerPC processor running
at 300MHz. This processor was chosen because it is a good representative for the level
of processing power that will be available in the next few years in radiation-hardened
processors. The computer runs the INTEGRITY real-time operating system [INTEG]
from Green Hills Software. The implementations of the signature schemes were com-
piled with an optimizing compiler [GHSC] also from Green Hills Software.
RSA and DSA were implemented using the large-integer support from the
GNU Multiple Precision (GMP) arithmetic library [GMP]. The GMP library uses
assembly-language routines for its core operations. Since GMP lacks support for elliptic
curve arithmetic, however, ECDSA was implemented using the MIRACL multipreci-
sion library [MIRACL] instead, which unfortunately does not offer assembly-language
optimizations for the PowerPC. SFLASH and TTS were implemented using a finite
field arithmetic library written by the author.
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Although complete implementations for some of the more popular signature
schemes like RSA already exist, they were not used in this evaluation for several reasons.
Signature schemes like RSA and DSA are simple enough that implementing them using
a large-integer library is not much harder than trying to port an existing implementa-
tion to the test platform. Furthermore, the easiest-to-port implementations are written
in plain C, whereas the implementations developed for this thesis can take advantage of
the assembly-language routines in the large-integer library. Finally, implementing the
signature schemes from scratch makes it easier to test the effects of different optimiza-
tions.
6.3 Methodology
For each signature scheme, the key generation, signing, and signature verification pro-
cesses were implemented. Once loaded onto the test board, the software would proceed
to generate a new key pair, then use it to sign and verify messages, repeating the process
enough times to get an accurate measurement of how long the signing and verification
processes take. (In a production system, the keys would have been generated offline
instead and hardcoded into the board, but for testing, it was easier to generate the keys
on the board directly.) The messages to be signed were usually 1KB–long strings of
random data. The elapsed times were measured using the high-resolution timer on the
test board, which claims to have a resolution of 2.3 ns or better.
6.3.1 Hash performance
All of the signature schemes that were tested specify hashing the message as part of
the signing process. Therefore, all of the timings reported here include the time it
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Message length (bytes): 128 256 384 512 640 768 896 1,024
Time (µs): 8.59 13.74 18.88 24.03 29.18 34.32 39.47 44.62
Table 6.2: SHA-1 performance on messages of various lengths. (Note that the times are
in microseconds, not milliseconds.)
takes to hash the message as required by the signature scheme. Since many of the
schemes called for a 160-bit hash output, the SHA-1 hash function [FIPS 180-1] was
used in the implementations of all of the schemes. The SHA-1 implementation used
was borrowed from an assembly-language implementation [Ma05] submitted to the
Git version control system project.
In general, the signing and verification functions take many times longer than
hashing the message, so the hashing time is insignificant, and the schemes would have
performed about the same had a different hash function been chosen. Table 6.2 shows
how long SHA-1 takes to hash messages of different lengths on the test platform.
6.3.2 Random number generation
All of the signature schemes tested require some source of randomness during the mes-
sage signing process. An unpredictable source of randomness is crucial for the security
of many of the signature schemes. As section 4.3.2 of this thesis explains, since the
nodes in a synchronized replicated system have very few sources of unpredictable ran-
domness available to them, the best way to generate random numbers is to include an
“entropy pool” in each node, and to use a cryptographically secure expansion function
to turn the pool into as many bytes of randomness as needed.
For the implementations described in the chapter, an entropy pool was not
used. Instead, the implementations simply relied on the rand() function from the
C standard library. The actual production system would use an entropy pool, but
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a cryptographically secure expansion function would not be very much slower than
rand(), so the benchmarks presented in this chapter would still be applicable.
6.4 RSA-PSS implementation
The most time-consuming part of the RSA algorithm is performing the modular ex-
ponentiations. Each exponentiation is implemented using the square-and-multiply al-
gorithm (or using a sequence of multiplications based on the addition chain for the
exponent), and each modular multiplication in turn involves a large-integer multiplica-
tion followed by a large-integer division.
Because modular exponentiation is so slow, one common optimization is to
speed up the computation of the signature using the Chinese remainder theorem. Since
p and q are relatively prime, one can compute σp = (md mod p) = (md mod (p−1) mod p)
(due to Fermat’s little theorem) and σq = (md mod q) = (md mod (q−1) mod q), then
combine them into σ = md mod pq using the Chinese remainder theorem. This
optimization cuts the size of both the modulus and the exponent in half, giving a pretty
drastic speed improvement.
However, one of the disadvantages of using this optimization is that if either
σp or σq is miscalculated, the recipient of the signature can deduce the factorization of
n, and hence learn the signer’s secret key [Le96]. If σp is miscalculated but σq is not, for
example, then σ e 6≡ m (mod p), but σ e ≡ m (mod q). Therefore, σ e −m is a multiple
of q but not of p, which means that gcd(σ e −m) reveals a factor of n.
Fortunately, in an environment like the FTPP, such a vulnerability is less
of a worry. Even if one node does miscalculate the signature, it is extraordinarily
improbable that a second node would try to exploit the fault—and in any case, the
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Modulus size (bits): 256 512 768 1,024
Signing time (ms): 0.87 4.37 11.38 24.69
Verification time (ms): 0.17 0.44 0.80 1.31
Table 6.3: RSA-PSS performance with moduli of various sizes, e = 65,537, using the
Chinese remainder theorem optimization.
FTPP only needs to tolerate one fault at a time. Thus, the Chinese remainder theorem
optimization can safely be implemented.
Note that the Chinese remainder theorem optimization can speed up message
signing, but the same optimization cannot be used for the verification process, since
the recipient does not know the factors p and q . Therefore, it makes sense to make the
verification exponent e smaller than the signing exponent d .
The benchmarks described here tested RSA with a variety of modulus sizes.
Most applications today that need cryptographic security use a modulus of at least 1,024
bits. A modulus of 512 bits can be factored on a large distributed computer system, and
a modulus of 256 bits can be factored in a under an hour on a single desktop computer.
A modulus shorter than 160 bits would have trouble accommodating the entire SHA-1
hash and the PSS encoding. Table 6.3 gives the performance of the RSA signature and
verification functions using moduli of different sizes.
6.5 DSA implementation
The DSA implementation used a q of 160 bits, to match the SHA-1 hash function. The
size of p varied. Solving the discrete logarithm problem for a p of a certain size is ap-
proximately as difficult as factoring an RSA modulus of the same size, so the discussion
on the security of RSA moduli of different sizes applies to the of p in DSA as well.
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One possible optimization for DSA is the precomputation technique described
in [FIPS 186-2]. The DSA signature is σ = (r, s), where r = (g k mod p)mod q , with k
being a randomly-chosen integer. Since r and k do not depend on the message, an im-
plementation can precompute a large set of r ’s and k’s (as well as the inverses of the k’s,
which will be needed for computing s ). However, this precomputation optimization
is not practical for a system like the FTPP, since a node in the system would quickly
use up all the precomputed values that any reasonable amount of memory can store.
Therefore, this optimization was not implemented for the benchmarks.
Another form of precomputation tries to speed up the exponentiation com-
putation itself. For example, the computation of ab , for a fixed base a and a variable
exponent b , can be sped up by precomputing {a2,a4,a8, . . .}. Then the value of ab can
by computed by simply multiplying together the appropriate precomputed powers of a
according to the binary expansion of b . This technique is faster than exponentiation
by squaring and multiplying, since using the precomputed powers is equivalent to elim-
inating the squaring steps. It is possible to extend this technique and use a larger set of
precomputed powers, trading off space for speed [BGMW92].
As part of the signature verification process, the recipient needs to compute
(g u1y u2 mod p)mod q , where y is the signer’s public key. To speed up this computation,
the recipient could precompute the powers of y as well. However, doing so would
require a lot of memory, since the recipient would have to precompute the powers
of y for every possible signer. Instead, a different optimization can be applied to the
verification process: a variation on the square-and-multiply algorithm can compute the
product of two exponentiations about as quickly as computing a single exponentiation.
The classic square-and-multiply algorithm to compute a single exponentiation
ab , for a 6= 0, is:
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Size of p (bits): 256 512 768 1,024
Signing time (ms): 0.93 2.41 4.39 6.98
Verification time (ms): 2.81 7.31 13.18 23.71
Table 6.4: DSA performance with p of various sizes, using precomputed powers of g
and Straus’s algorithm.
r ← 1
for i frommsb(b ) down to 0:
r ← r 2
if bi = 1 then r ← r · a
end for
return r
where msb(b ) gives the index of the most-significant bit of b , and where bi denotes the
i th bit of b , with i = 0 being the least-significant bit.
Straus’s algorithm [St64] allows ab11 a
b2
2 · · ·abnn to be computed using just one
pass over all of the exponents simultaneously. (This optimization is also sometimes
called “Shamir’s trick” because [El84] credits Shamir for pointing it out.) For example,
the product of two powers ab c d , for a, b 6= 0, can be computed by:
r ← 1
for i frommax(msb(b ), msb(d )) down to 0:
r ← r 2
if bi = 1 ∧ di = 1 then r ← r · ac
else if bi = 1 then r ← r · a
else if di = 1 then r ← r · c
end for
return r
Note that since ac is constant, its value only needs to be computed once.
The implementation of DSA that was benchmarked uses both of the precom-
putation optimization and Straus’s algorithm. Table 6.4 gives the performance results
for DSA with different sizes of p.
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6.6 ECDSA implementation
ECDSA can be implemented on either a prime field or a binary field. The benchmark
program that comes with the MIRACL library indicated that a prime field implemen-
tation would be slightly faster, so a prime field was chosen for this benchmark.
Since ECDSA is an analogue of DSA, many of the optimizations for DSA also
apply to ECDSA as well. In particular, the optimizations of using precomputation in
the signing process and using Straus’s algorithm in the signature verification process
carry over directly to ECDSA. Additional optimizations specific to ECDSA also exist.
Many of the optimizations involve choosing system parameters that satisfy cer-
tain special forms. For example, with the prime field Fp , reduction modulo p is faster
when the binary form of p consists of almost all ones (a generalized Mersenne prime).
Binary fields, which are somewhat more complicated, offer many more parameters
that can be specially tuned. One of the disadvantages of using special choices for the
parameters is that the implementations become extremely parameter-specific, which
is undesirable if an application needs to interoperate with other applications that use
different parameters.
Another avenue for optimization which is not parameter-specific is the repre-
sentation of the elliptic curve points themselves. This thesis has so far described a point
as a pair of coordinates (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq . This representation is the affine-coordinate
representation. However, other coordinate systems are possible as well. The formulas
for adding a pair of points and for doubling a point have faster-to-compute forms in
other coordinate systems. Using projective coordinates, for example, a point (x, y) is
represented as the triple (X ,Y,Z), where x = X /Z and y = Y /Z . The addition and
doubling formulas do not use division in projective coordinates, making them faster.
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Signing time: 6.98ms
Verification time: 20.08ms
Table 6.5: ECDSA performance with a 160-bit prime field, using projective coordinates,
precomputation, and Straus’s algorithm.
[CMO98] compares different coordinate systems, and advocates mixing coordinate
systems for maximum efficiency.
Table 6.5 gives the performance of ECDSA, optimized with precomputation
and Straus’s algorithm. The implementation used the MIRACL library for elliptic
curve arithmetic. MIRACL does not have assembly-language optimizations for the
PowerPC, but it does offer point representations in projective coordinates.
The specific elliptic curve used for this benchmark was the “secp160k1”
curve from [SEC2]. It is a curve on a 160-bit prime field.
6.7 A library for finite-field arithmetic
The remaining two signature schemes are multivariate quadratic (MQ) schemes. MQ
schemes offer a lot of room for micro-optimizations, since they generally repeat small
operations a large number of times. Therefore, small changes to the way a frequently-
used operation is written can have large effects on the overall performance.
In order to evaluate the two MQ signature schemes, the author implemented
a library for performing finite-field arithmetic, written in C. Both SFLASH and TTS
use small fields—F128 and F256, respectively—so field elements were represented as single
bytes, and vectors of field elements were represented as arrays of bytes.
Themost frequently used operation is fieldmultiplication, so a lot of effort was
applied to making it as efficient as possible. Multiplication was implemented using log-
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arithms: xy = g logg x+logg y , for a suitable generator g . The logarithms were performed
using log/antilog tables. (An alternative is to build a large table that gives the product
of every possible pair of x’s and y’s in a single lookup, but such a table would not fit
into the processor’s cache very well.)
One of the goals in implementing multiplication was that the code be entirely
branchless: the code should not use any conditional statements, which were measured
to be considerably slower. This is challenging because multiplication by zero needs spe-
cial handling, since log(0) cannot be defined in any way that gives the correct semantics
for multiplication. The multiplication function was implemented as:
static inline unsigned mult(unsigned x, unsigned y,
const unsigned char *logTbl, const unsigned char *antilogTbl) {
return antilogTbl[logTbl[x] + logTbl[y]] & -((x != 0) & (y != 0));
}
where logTbl is the table of logarithms and antilogTbl is the table of powers. The
antilogTbl is twice the size of the logTbl, to prevent needing to compute the sum
of the logarithms modulo |F| − 1, where F is the field.
Some quantities in an MQ signature scheme are always used as multipliers (the
coefficients in the public key, for example, or the inverse matrices M−11 and M
−1
3 in the
secret key), so they are stored in logarithm form to save a lookup during multiplication;
a separate version of the multiplication function is defined for them. To allow zeros to
be stored, log(0) is stored as 0, and log(1) is stored as |F| − 1.
The finite-field arithmetic library also implements functions that operate on
vectors and matrices of field elements, such as matrix multiplication and Gaussian elim-
ination on a system of equations. The dimensions of the matrices and vectors need
to be passed to the functions as arguments, but the library also offers the option of
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hardcoding them through #defines so that the compiler’s constant propagator can
optimize them away.
6.8 SFLASH implementation
SFLASH is notable in that it needs to operate on the L, the 37th-degree extension of
the field K = F128. The finite-field library implemented functions to multiply elements
from L efficiently.
The most interesting problem in SFLASH is implementing the inverse of the
central map F . The inverse is F −1(B) = B (12811+1)−1 (mod 12837−1), where B ∈ L. The
exponent (12811+1)−1 (mod 12837−1) is a huge number, and using square-and-multiply
exponentiation is too slow.
[ACDG03] describes some of the techniques for optimizing F −1. One key
insight is that X 128 (and the higher powers X 128n ) is a linear transformation of the
coefficients in X , so it can be implemented by a matrix multiplication. Furthermore,
the matrix would only consist of ones and zeros, which allows further optimizations.
Using the linear properties of X 128 in L, [ACDG03] gives an addition chain
for computing B (12811+1)−1 (mod 12837−1) using a small number of multiplications:
A1 = B
4 A5 =A
2
4×A4 A9 = (A5×A8)1288
A2 = BA1 A6 =A
4
3 A10 =A
1287
6 ×A6×A8×A9
A3 =A
4
1 A7 =A5× ((A1286 )128)128 A11 = ((A128710 )1288 ×A9)1287 ×A10
A4 =A2×A3 A8 = ((A1287 ×A7)128×A7)128
Then A11 = B (128
11+1)−1 (mod 12837−1).
SFLASH specifies that the hash output is a vector inK26, which is 182 bits long.
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Signing time: 2.13ms
Verification time: 0.75ms
Table 6.6: SFLASH performance.
Since SHA-1 only produces 160 bits of output, it needs to be called twice. The first 182
bits of hash(m) ‖ hash(hash(m)) is then used as the message hash.
A minor wrinkle in implementing SFLASH is that it uses a field K = F128 that
is seven bits wide, but the rest of the system produces bytes that are eight bits wide.
Therefore, a conversion routine is needed to pack and unpack the bits.
Table 6.6 presents the performance of the SFLASH signature scheme, using
the optimizations described here.
6.9 TTS implementation
TTS is somewhat simpler to implement than SFLASH. Inverting the central map
in TTS requires solving a randomly-generated system of nine equations for nine un-
knowns, which was implemented using Gaussian elimination.
Since the systems of equations are randomly generated, they are not always
solvable. Unfortunately, there is no way to detect whether a system of equations is
solvable much faster than actually solving them. The Gaussian elimination routine that
was implemented returns an error if it detects that the system of equations is unsolv-
able, signaling the implementation to try again. This detection happens about half way
through the Gaussian elimination process, when the algorithm has reduced the matrix
containing the coefficients of the equations into a triangular form.
Table 6.7 gives the timings for signing and signature verification in TTS. It
also gives how long it takes to generate a random system of equations, attempt to solve
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Signing time: 0.208ms
Verification time: 0.426ms
Unsolvable equations time: 0.028ms
Table 6.7: TTS performance. The unsolvable equations time is the time it takes to set
up a system of nine equations for nine unknowns, attempt to solve them, and realize
that they are unsolvable.
them, and realize that they cannot be solved. A fault-tolerant system using TTS will
need to allow time for enough retries that the probability of still failing to obtain the
signature becomes acceptably low.
6.10 Conclusion
Table 6.8 summarizes the results of all of the tested signature schemes. The final column
“sign+ 3 verifies” is the time it takes to compute one signature and verify it three times.
This represents the amount of time that the message authentication would take in a
four-node system for a single-source message exchange: the sender node needs to sign
its message, and each of the recipient nodes needs to verify the signature on the three
copies of the message it receives.
The performance of the signature scheme implementations developed for this
thesis is generally in line with the benchmarks from the other sources presented earlier.
Most of the differences can probably be attributed to the different platforms that were
used. Looking at the ratios between signing and verification times, the ratio for the
1,024-bit RSA implementation in this thesis appears to be much larger than the one for
the implementation in [Pr03b, table 13]. However, this ratio seems very sensitive to the
key size, so the discrepancy can be explained if the sensitivity is slightly stronger for the
implementation in this thesis. Another notable discrepancy is that the ratio between
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Signature
scheme
Signature
length (bytes)
Signing
time (ms)
Verification
time (ms)
Sign + 3 verifies
time (ms)
RSA-PSS-256 32 0.87 0.17 1.38
RSA-PSS-512 64 4.37 0.44 5.69
RSA-PSS-768 96 11.38 0.80 13.78
RSA-PSS-1024 128 24.69 1.31 28.62
DSA-256 40 0.93 2.81 9.36
DSA-512 40 2.41 7.31 24.34
DSA-768 40 4.39 13.18 43.93
DSA-1024 40 6.98 23.71 78.09
ECDSA 40 6.98 20.08 67.22
SFLASH 33 2.13 0.75 4.38
TTS 28 0.208 0.426 1.486
Table 6.8: Summary of performance results for all signature schemes.
the signing time and verification time for the ECDSA implementation in this thesis is
smaller than the ratio in [Pr03b, table 37]. However, it is unclear if the implementation
in [Pr03b, table 37] uses precomputation for signing; if it does not, then its signing time
would understandably be larger.
As expected, the MQ signature schemes gave the best performance among
the signature schemes with security levels of at least 280, with TTS being the fastest,
although the insecure 256-bit RSA had the fastest overall time for one signature and
three verifications. And as noted earlier, the time allotted to TTS would need to be
increased to reduce the probability of failing to compute a signature.
Disappointingly, none of the signature schemes tested would be able to com-
plete a single-source message exchange in under 1ms, and certainly not in the 200 µs that
the current version of the FTPP without message authentication takes [Bu01]. Perhaps
with additional optimizations, the signature and verification times could be reduced by
a factor of two or so, but an order-of-magnitude improvement would be needed before
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these signature schemes become usable.
These results indicate that cryptographically secure signature schemes, or even
somewhat insecure ones like RSA and DSA with reduced key sizes, are too slow for
a system that needs to send messages at a very high rate. If a fault-tolerant computer
system must use authenticated messages, then the only currently viable solution is to
resort to an insecure signature scheme.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
This thesis considered the practical implementation of a message authentication scheme
for a Byzantine-resilient fault-tolerant computer system. It shows that a system using
message authentication can use fewer nodes than a system not using message authenti-
cation while still achieving the same level of reliability.
Specifically, this thesis attempted to develop a message authentication scheme
for a new version of the X-38 Fault Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP), a fault-tolerant
computer system from Draper Laboratory that is designed for demanding applications
like human spaceflight. The FTPP achieves its reliability by running its programs on
multiple replicated nodes that maintain synchronized state. The current version of the
FTPP, which does not use authenticated messages, is a five-node system that can handle
the non-simultaneous failures of any two nodes. A new version of the FTPP could be
equally fault tolerant with only four nodes if it uses message authentication.
The FTPP uses a two-round voting protocol to come to a consensus on mes-
sages that originate from a single node. In the protocol, the node with a message to
send broadcasts it to all of its peers, then its peers reflect the message they receive to
each other. At the end of the protocol, each node ends up with multiple copies of the
message, and it chooses the most common copy to be the correct copy of the message.
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The voting protocol is necessary because a faulty sender node may send different mes-
sages to different recipient nodes, but all of the recipient nodes need to agree on the
message they received, since all of the nodes are supposed to be operating in the same
state. Examining the voting process, this thesis concluded that messages only need to
be signed during the first round, and only by the original sender.
A Byzantine-resilient system should tolerate faults in the nodes of the system,
even if they fail in unexpected and unlikely ways. For this reason, this thesis strongly
recommended cryptographically secure signature schemes for message authentication.
With an insecure scheme, certain sequences of faults can lead to a node forging amessage
from another node. Only a cryptographically secure scheme can guarantee that a faulty
node cannot forge signatures, even if it were actively trying to do so.
This thesis then presented several candidates for the signature scheme to be
used to implement message authentication. A suitable signature scheme should be
cryptographically secure, but it also must be fast, two requirements that conflict with
each other. The FTPP needs to send messages at a very high rate, and that rate will
only increase over time as applications produce and consume more and more data. For-
tunately, computer processors have also been becoming faster. Although an all-software
implementation of message authentication would have been out of the question for the
original version of the FTPP, it was hoped that more modern processors have become
powerful enough to allow the implementation of a cryptographically secure signature
scheme in a new version of the FTPP.
This thesis implemented and evaluated the signature schemes RSA, DSA, el-
liptic curve DSA, SFLASH, and TTS. These signature schemes have widely varying
signing and verification times, signature lengths, and memory requirements. Unfortu-
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nately, all of them turned out to be too slow. Even the fastest of them would need to
run an order of magnitude faster to satisfy the message rates of the FTPP.
The signature schemes implemented in this thesis are still useful, since they
would be suitable for a low-message-rate fault-tolerant system that needs authenticated
messages. For the FTPP, however, one must conclude that cryptographically secure sig-
nature schemes are not yet feasible on the current generation of embedded processors.
7.1 Cryptographic security versus speed: a
compromise
A message authentication implementation for the FTPP must settle for a cryptograph-
ically insecure signature scheme. However, an appropriate scheme must still be secure
enough that producing forged messages does not become trivial. This thesis cannot rec-
ommend any particular candidate for the signature scheme at this point, but a suitable
one should have these properties:
1. Different messages should produce different signatures. With very high prob-
ability, changing even one bit of the message should result in a signature
that looks very different. No simple modification to a message-signature pair
should produce a new message-signature pair that is valid. This requirement
suggests that the signature scheme use a hash function like SHA-1 or MD5.
From the benchmark testing done for this thesis, it appears that a cryptograph-
ically secure hash function will run fast enough, even on moderately slow
processors like the ones that will be used in the new version FTPP. If a secure
hash function is too slow, using a CRC may be acceptable. Something like a
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simple checksum, however, is not suitable as a hash function, since it is too
easy to corrupt the message in a way that does not change its checksum.
2. The output of the hash function, and the signature itself, should be at least 64
bits long, and preferably longer. A signature of this length ensures that even if a
faulty node were to transmit randomly generated messages for the duration of
the FTPP’s operating lifetime, it would still be unable to forge a valid signature
with any realistic probability.
3. The signing and verification process should be different, and they should de-
pend on different data. This suggests a public-key signature scheme, where the
secret key is known only to one node. The danger with a scheme in which
the key for signing and the key for signature verification is the same is that
something as simple as a single-bit error in an array index could cause a node
to sign with another node’s key, thereby forging a signature.
4. The procedure to generate the secret key from the public key, or to forge a
signature, should not be simple. RSA with a reduced-size modulus, for exam-
ple, meets this requirement: even if the modulus can be easily factored, it is
extraordinarily unlikely that a series of faults would precisely implement the
steps of a factoring algorithm.
A cryptographically insecure but sufficiently complex signing function combined with
a secure hash functionmay yield a signature scheme that meets all of these requirements.
Candidates for the insecure signing function include RSA with very short moduli and
functions based on matrix multiplication (where signing is multiplication by a secret
matrix, and verification is multiplication by its inverse). However, more analysis is
needed before any signature scheme can be recommended.
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7.2 Possibilities for future research
One avenue for future research, of course, is to continue the work of this thesis and find
a faster signature scheme that can be used for message authentication in the FTPP.
However, the signature schemes described in this thesis, even though they are
too slow for the FTPP, can still be put to use elsewhere. TTS, for example, would
make a good candidate for a system with lower message rate requirements. Another
possibility is to use special hardware to accelerate these signature schemes. The goal of
the FTPP is to build a fault-tolerant system without using custom hardware, but other
systems may not have the same restriction.
This thesis is part of a larger effort at Draper Laboratory to build a better
fault-tolerant computer system, and there are certainly many opportunities for further
work as part of that effort. The focus this year has been on communication within the
system, but future work will address topics like fault detection and recovery.
Looking more broadly, this thesis covers several general themes. Each of them
is rich with opportunities for further research:
Cryptography for specific applications Much of cryptography is focused on infor-
mation security. This thesis is somewhat unusual in that uses cryptography for relia-
bility instead. Many distributed systems can be simplified if the member nodes can be
prevented from cheating, which is where cryptographic techniques become useful.
Looking at the cryptographic algorithms themselves, it is clear that many of
them have been developed to meet specific requirements. For example, encryption
and signature schemes based on elliptic curves offer the same benefits as the more
classical schemes like RSA, but the elliptic curve schemes can use smaller keys. The
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multivariate quadratic schemes, in turn, can run much faster. It is reasonable to expect
that further research will someday produce secure signature schemes fast enough to use
in demanding systems like the FTPP.
Implementation and optimization techniques During the course of this thesis, a
lot of effort was devoted to making the signature schemes run as quickly as possible.
However, the benchmarks in this thesis are obviously not the final word on how fast
signature schemes can be made to run. More research on optimization techniques can
be expected to produce both small improvements and algorithmic breakthroughs that
give dramatic speedups.
Building more robust systems Currently, fault-tolerant computer systems still oc-
cupy only a small niche in computer engineering. One might encounter a fault-tolerant
computer system when one gets on an airplane, or when one uses an electronic medi-
cal device, but in general, most of the computer systems one encounters are not even
remotely as reliable as a system like the FTPP. Not all systems need to be as reliable,
of course, and not all systems can afford to be. However, more research into building
systems that do need to be extremely reliable will yield techniques that can be applied
to ordinary systems as well, ultimately making all computer systems more reliable.
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